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ABSTRACT  
The study attempts to recover the figure of King Charles Mhlontlo who fell out of favor with 
his colonial masters after he resisted going to war against his neighbors during the debacle 
that led to the killing of Hamilton Hope, magistrate of Qumbu in 1880. Three elements are 
explored in the study. Firstly, I consider the contested figure of Mhlontlo and how history 
writing presented and represented Mhlontlo in particular ways. Secondly, I consider the 
presentation and representation of Mhlontlo with regard to the death of Hope in the archive 
and the traditions of history writing that defines the king as a contested figure in the works of 
history. Thirdly, I consider the particular tensions of remembering the past and how it is 
recorded brought to the fore as a continuation to a Whig concept of history and how South 
Africa especially the New South Africa tried to deal with the question of state and kingship in 
terms of such an historiographical inheritance. At the heart of my interest in the Mpondomise 
king is the question of how we are to read the post-apartheid state’s independent commission 
of enquiry’ called the Nhlapo Commission that ruled on the future of relationships between 
the monarchy and democratic institutions. The study questions the stance of the democratic 
state in how it dealt with the question of traditional leadership by tracing its emergence in the 
complex genealogy of the inheritance of Whig History.   
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Preface   
 
Notwithstanding the existence of deconstructionist thought in the post-apartheid and post-
colonial South Africa, President Thabo Mbeki, a trained economist and a former member of 
the South African Communist Party, reintroduced the Whig debate in South Africa in 2004.1 
The Whig debate constituted itself as a formal debate in the country when he appointed the 
Nhlapo Commission in which the state devolved it powers to the commission with a rider that 
its recommendations will be implemented by the state.2 The state used public consultations, 
in full view of the interested and affected members of society, to deliberate on the issues in 
cases where the commission addressed the affected traditional leaders. The media was 
involved in disseminating some of the proceedings; others were recorded and were kept in 
archives of media houses. Jeff Peires, in his critique of the Nhlapo commission, which he was 
part of, suggested that Mbeki appointed Thandabantu Nhlapo, a British trained customary law 
expert, as a chairperson of the commission.3 Peires argued that a string of legal experts 
formed a big part of the commission together with a lesser number of social scientists. For 
him, the constitution or the composition of the commission tilted the scales and affected the 
work of the commission in that the disciplines that were involved were not equally 
distributed. Instead the concentration of professional knowledge was more legal. Peires 
would have preferred it to be composed by a number of social scientists so as to allow 
enough room for social scientific debates.4  
 
                                                          
1 Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu and Miranda Strydom, The Thabo Mbeki I know, (Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2016), 
p 94. 
2 Jeff Peires, ‘History versus Customary Law: The Commission on Traditional Leadership: Disputes and Claims 
(2004 – 2012) unpublished paper, (Alice: University of Fort Hare, 2013), p 1 
3 Ibid  
4 Ibid  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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But President Jacob Zuma, who followed President Mbeki in becoming president of South 
Africa, when addressing traditional leaders in 2009, argued along the trope of Whig history.5 
In his statement, Zuma argued that the protracted struggle between the royals and the 
republicans as a compromised battle in history has always favored the republicans over the 
royals. Here Zuma alluded to Whig history writings that marked and framed how British, 
American and South African history writing was influenced by the nature of state against 
royalty debates. The conflict of old institutions from the past against progress was an 
overarching debate that was evident in the Marxist tools of analysis, like the negation of 
negation, took central stage where social institutions and epochs gave way to new ones. 
Interestingly, Jacob Zuma, like Thabo Mbeki, were schooled in Marxism as part of his 
political formation. Such training did well to anchor their narratives on progress in the 
passing of time, which firmly roots the entanglement of time to history. 
 
I want to suggest that the establishment, constitution and the workings of the Nhlapo 
Commission was a recasting and a resurrection of the Whig history debate in the post-
apartheid, post-colonial South Africa by Thabo Mbeki in October 2004. The threads of 
discourse leading to and from its establishment, constitution, Mbeki’s Marxist political 
background and the circumstances around its formation brought to life a debate that Marxist 
historians and deconstructionist historians carefully put to rest in the annals of history.6 This 
was particularly the case where the commission found that there were no grounds for 
amaMpondomise to claim kingship according to customary law and practice on the basis that 
they did not fight any war for the establishment of their kingship.  
 
                                                          
5 http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=583 (accessed on 3 May 2015) 
6 Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu and Miranda Strydom, The Thabo Mbeki I know, (Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2016), 
p 94. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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Mahmood Mamdani argues that customary law was a careful construct and function of 
British colonial assemblage to rule its colonies. In contrast, Thabo Mbeki may be said to have 
inadvertently continued this colonial tradition and also brought back to the life of official 
discourse elements of the historical Whig debate. In that respect, its terms and conditions 
were clear and showed that the state had to have the final say on the dichotomy of the state 
versus the monarchy. 
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Chapter One 
 
Mhlontlo; the death of Hamilton Hope and aftermath an interplay of 
influence and power. 
 
The chapter is about a reconstruction of the context of Charles Mhlontlo, drawing from the 
colonial archive and oral histories. Here I will make an effort to look at Mhlontlo as he 
related to colonial rule personified in his interaction with magistrate Hamilton Hope in the 
period before Hope’s death in 1880. The idea of the attack on Hope’s body with assegais by 
Mhlontlo’s subjects, the symbolism of the attack to amaMpondomise, the debacle with 
colonial gun powder and the different stories that emanated from the incident will be 
examined. 
 
There is an existing body of work that related to the encounters of Mhlontlo and Hope in the 
academy that I glean. To this end I want to take the accounts of Clifton Crais and Christopher 
Saunders when they studied and sought to explain the tension of chieftaincy and the state 
under colonial rule. Their contribution is particularly important when we want to understand 
the issues of that tension when exploring a historiography of Mhlontlo. Equally, I will 
examine the work of Joe Majija and the Nhlapo Commission report on amaMpondomise as 
alternate sources that facilitated a platform for the expressions of oral histories about 
Mhlontlo in post-apartheid South Africa. In recognizing the tension that was produced by the 
academy as it developed an authoritative alternative discourse or official historiography of 
Mhlontlo I will think with Anne Stoler, Jacques Derrida and Premesh Lalu as I pursue the 
question of writing about Mhlontlo after the fact of his existence. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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Heritage a cultural symbol of power and conflict 
 
Gerard Peter, a travel magazine editor of South African Airlines, in his September 2015 issue 
of Skyways, when examining the process of rebuilding the prestige of the old African 
university city Timbuktu noted that “[t]hroughout history, civilizations and the products of 
those civilizations such as historic artefacts, architecture and religious iconography to a 
greater extent have been threatened or destroyed through deliberate aggression.7 He went on 
to say that “history is filled with examples of the might of one culture overpowering the sum 
of another, significantly buckling the course of history and erasing parts of history.”8 In this 
regard Peter suggested that the contact point of people that came from different civilizations 
and cultures tended to rub against each other in ways that altered civilizations and cultures of 
less powerful people. Where the erosion, destruction and undermining of other cultures and 
civilizations was prevalent and tended to be the order of the day, in the words of Uday Singh 
Mehta this was a sense of unfamiliarity. Peter argues that such contact affected symbols of 
civilizations and cultures like iconography, artefacts and architecture for instance. At another 
point he suggests that the same processes and activities “significantly buckling the course of 
history and erasing parts of history.” Peter’s argument persuades me to think about the 
contact and the encounter of Mhlontlo with the colonial magistrate Hamilton Hope and 
Hopes death in Sulenkama, and later Mhlontlo’s deposition as a direct result of Hope’s death, 
as I will argue in this chapter.9.  
 
                                                          
7 Gerard Peter, ‘Timbuktu: rebuilding a historic ancient city’, Skyways 20th anniversary: celebrating two 
decades of a successful partnership, (Kyalami: Panorama Media, September 2015), p 39. 
8 Gerard Peter, ‘Timbuktu: rebuilding a historic ancient city’, Skyways 20th anniversary: celebrating two 
decades of a successful partnership, (Kyalami: Panorama Media, September 2015), p 39. 
9 For a clearer understanding of this read; Joe H, Majija, Dark clouds at Sulenkama: a true history, (Umthatha: 
2009)  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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 Crais, Saunders and the colonial record, as we will see, apportion the fall of Mhlontlo and 
the end of the amaMpondomise kingdom to the act of killing the colonial magistrate 
Hamilton Hope. However, according to the amaMpondomise word press, amaMpondomise, 
to this day, lament the fall of their kingship in 1904 a time when Mhlontlo was deposed by 
the King William’s Town court and continue to call for its reinstatement.10  In that court 
Mhlontlo was not found guilty of killing Hope as a result of lack of the original letter that was 
written by Davis in October 1880 but was deposed and relocated to be among the Gcaleka 
people far from his homestead. In their recollection of the kingdom they see the decision to 
depose Mhlontlo as a deliberate effort by the colonial state to destroy the kingship of 
Mhlontlo beyond recovery. As if to be in conversation with amaMpondomise, Gerard Peter, 
while enunciating on the rebuilding of Timbuktu back to its prestigious position in the past, 
argued that “[t]oday, the destruction of cultural heritage is a continuing concern.” He puts it 
at the center of modern day “warfare”. In arguing his point, he suggests that today the 
destruction of cultural heritage is “premeditated” to advance the tactics of warfare, I would 
add, in whatever manner it manifests itself.  
 
Here Peter argues for the recognition of subtle power that was found in cultural heritage. He 
considered this subtle power to be an underlying existence of an expressed identity that was 
connected to symbols of culture. His idea of a recognized pattern of attacks on cultural 
symbols helps to formulate part of what he considers to be some of the most influential 
“psychological weapons of modern warfare.” At best Peter sees the attacks on such symbols 
as a new and sophisticated way of combat and that such combat cuts through the foundational 
elements of the people that are associated with that culture which he calls the “soul”. He 
                                                          
10 https://amampondomise.wordpress.com/2014/01/29/amampondomise-restatement-of-resoluions-taken-
ebhotwe/ (accessed on 3 May 2015) 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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makes a clear argument to say that this kind of warfare is deliberate and “premeditated”. In 
other words, Peter is suggesting that such acts are not accidents and in fact they are calculated 
ways of “significantly buckling the course of history and erasing parts of history”.11  
 
Joe Majija argues that there “are numerous accounts” “of the story of the killing of 
Magistrate Hamilton Hope by the Mpondomise in 1880 is as intriguing as the life of Chief 
Mhlontlo, the Mpondomise Chief who was ruling at the time of the killing of Hamilton Hope, 
the magistrate at Qumbu at the time.”12 In this chapter I am going to examine some of these 
accounts and continue to trace the voice of Mhlontlo as I go along. 
 
Crais recovers the story of the death of Hope the in his book The politics of evil: Magic, State 
Power, and the Political Imagination in South Africa published in 2002.13 The book provides 
a new reflection on the modern South African past. It offers a fresh perspective to the close 
examination of power, resistance and culture in the modern era. Crais studies the processes 
and the building blocks involved in the firm and ever controlling political order. Over and 
above that, his is the study of how people understood and fought against the colonial state in 
a multiple way. He studies how the state is built up as a cultural and political process and a 
moral problem and contrasts this with how the indigenous people relate to it as power, 
authority and evil. All these mixed together and influenced each other to formulate the 
texture of the making of the colonial state and how colonial power was exercised. 
 
                                                          
11 Gerard Peter, ‘Timbuktu: rebuilding a historic ancient city’, Skyways 20th anniversary: celebrating two 
decades of a successful partnership, (Kyalami: Panorama Media, September 2015), p 39. 
12 Joe H. Majija, Dark clouds at Sulenkama: a true story, (Umthatha: 2009) p 3. 
13 Clifton Crais, The Politics of Evil: Magic, State Power, and the Political Imagination in South Africa, (Cape 
Town: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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In the opening lines of chapter one: ‘The death of Hope’ Crais firmly illustrates the loyalty of 
Mhlontlo to Hope and he argues that Mhlontlo fully supported Hope. “He held Hope in his 
hand. “Go on I will follow,” the Mpondomise paramount chief told the British magistrate 
Hamilton Hope in the early days of October 1880, “And where you die I will die.” As 
Mhlontlo spoke these unwiring words of loyalty the chief’s wife lay ill not too far away, 
slowly perishing from a long disease.”14 In this way Crais described Mhlontlo as a willing 
collaborator to colonial authority, his was an unproblematized notion of the relationship 
between Mhlontlo the colonial magistrate that was indicated by the words he inscribed in 
how we come to know Mhlontlo in his work. The words that Crais allotted to Mhlontlo - “and 
where you die I will die” - suggested that Mhlontlo was willing to lay his life for the safety 
and protection of the life of the magistrate. If it need be, Mhlontlo, according to the text in 
Crais’ book, was willing to die instead in the place of Hope.15 
 
The surviving colonial witness who was on the scene 
 
The official record also affirms the collaboration of Mhlontlo through a letter of A. E Davis, 
the only direct witness of the death of Hope. In the letter Davis the clerk of the resident 
magistrate of Qumbu at the time, described Mhlontlo as one that agreed to meet Hope and his 
team for the purposes of going “to quell the rebellion in Matatiele District.”16 Davis placed on 
record that Hope and Mhlontlo had a standing agreement to join forces in arms and that Hope 
went to meet Mhlontlo in the strength of an agreed appointment. The letter further illustrated 
the cordial relations between Mhlontlo and Hope, stating that Mhlontlo joined Hope with 
“four hundred” men to be enlisted for war on Friday. Davis said “on the morning [Friday] 
                                                          
14 Clifton Crais, The Politics of Evil: Magic, State Power, and the Political Imagination in South Africa, (Cape 
Town: Cambridge University Press, 2002) p 35 
15 Ibid  
16 Joe H. Majija, Dark clouds at Sulenkama: a true story, (Umthatha: 2009), pp 79 - 84  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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about four hundred armed men collected with Mhlontlo and Mr. Hope addressed a few words 
to them.” Davis continued to say “Mr. Hope addressed a few words to them telling them why 
they were there, and that those who were willing to accompany him and Mhlontlo to fight 
against “Mugwayi’s Basotos” would be enrolled, and that he wished them make as much 
haste as possible.17 According to the account of Davis’ letter, Hope was active, taking charge 
of the battalion while on the other hand Mhlontlo was reticent and passive, suggesting 
consent on Mhlontlo’s part. 
 
Davis described Mhlontlo as one that was giving full support to the magistrate, leaving no 
room for any notion that Mhlontlo was reluctant to join Hope.  He suggested that Hope and 
Mhlontlo shared the same understanding about the importance and urgency of the move to 
“Matatiele”.  He suggested that during a dinner, “Mhlontlo said he was fully alive to the fact 
that no delay was necessary and promised to accompany Mr. Hope on the morrow”18.  This is 
after Mhlontlo requested to delay the move so that more of his men could join the following 
day meaning Saturday.  According to Davis, Mhlontlo gave an undertaking that he and his 
men join Hope.  But Davis also mentioned that Mhlontlo gave the undertaking after a long 
discussion between Mhlontlo and Hope.” During this time, Mr. Hope had a long conversation 
with Mhlontlo who told him that he wished to push on to Mr. Rutters where he had arranged 
to meet Mr. Thomson, Resident Magistrate of Maclear District.”19  The nature of the “long 
conservation” is of interest to me, especially in as far as Davis is the source that records the 
wishes of Hope and the consent of Mhlontlo. 
 
                                                          
17 Ibid  
18 Ibid 
19 Ibid  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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The “long conversation” of the night before and the wishes of Hope and the consent by 
Mhlontlo, according to Davis, met a good amount of men the following morning.  Davis 
argues that on “Saturday the 23rd instantly the men arrived early and some seven or eight 
hundred had collected all armed”.20 The turnout suggested a good response on the part of 
amaMpondomise to the call that was made to go “to quell the rebellion”. However, Hope was 
not satisfied and had a good deal of suspicion according to the letter that Davis, when he 
observed that “Mhlontlo and some twenty of his councilors were in close conversation, and 
messengers were constantly going to and fro between Mhlontlo and the different clans.”21 
Davis argued that Hope instructed his men to “secretly load their rifles”, suggesting a state of 
nervousness on the part of the magistrate. This suspicion as amaMpondomise conversed 
while they did their war rituals suggested that Hope considered it to be superstitious or, 
perhaps, that there is one thing or another that happened which Davis did not record in his 
letter.  
 
What could possibly threaten the confident colonial magistrate of Qumbu in conversations 
that send and receive messages from can to clan? What Davis recorded in his letter about the 
events of the day did not show any sign of endangering a life. However, when setting atones 
for suspicion one can inscribe oneself in the text of a report. For instance, Davis suggested 
that an intimidated magistrate was brought in the center of a circle of men that were doing 
“umguyo”, a war ritual according to Davis. “About 1 o’clock Mhlontlo then came to Mr. 
Hope and sat down in the Marquee with us all, and after partaking of a friendly glass of 
Brandy and water, asked us all to go up to the “Umguyo” where he said it would be decided 
                                                          
20 Ibid 
21 Ibid 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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upon what number of men would be enrolled.22 He also suggested that Hope and the whole 
team were invited to join in. 
 
At this point Davis grants Mhlontlo agency and firmly puts him in the position of control, an 
agency he later devolves to amaMpondomise. He argued that after Mhlontlo stopped the 
singing and dancing he said a few words and took an action of removing himself and Davis 
from the rest of the men, including Hope and his men. 
 
Mhlontlo then addressed the people saying “Mpondomise there is your Magistrate.  We are 
Government people in the true sense” of the word Government is our rock and shade.  I am 
going aside to inform Sunduza (myself) the words which I wish Mr. Hope “to say” Mhlontlo 
then led me out of the ring and when about ten yards away we stood. 
 
The act of moving out of the circle activated agency for amaMpondomise.  With Mhlontlo 
out of the scene then other role players come into center stage.  Davis argued that  
 
At that moment I saw the men fall on Messrs. Hope, Warrene and Herman with their 
assegais and stab them to death.  Mhlontlo and three of his men held me fast and 
disarmed me, and after Mr. Hope was killed some thirsty men rushed up to me and 
would have stabbed me, but Mhlontlo ordered them back saying that no man was to 
lay hands on me, that he has saved my life through my father being one of the oldest 
missionaries, and my brother (Revd. W.S. Davis) being their missionary.  That he 
(Mhlontlo) was fight only again the Government that all missionaries and their sons 
as well as the shopkeepers were to be saved.23 
                                                          
22 Ibid 
23 Ibid 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 19 
 
 
Davis acknowledges that Mhlontlo did not kill Hope with his hands.  Neither did he directly 
implicate Mhlontlo by instructing that Hope be killed.  He further mentioned that his own life 
was saved because of Mhlontlo’s interventions when “some thirsty men rushed up to me and 
would have stabbed me, but Mhlontlo ordered them back”.24  However, Davis implicated 
Mhlontlo in the death of Hope by saying Mhlontlo argued that he “was fighting only against 
the Government.”25 This is important especially understanding that magistrates, soldiers and 
colonialists are viewed as representatives of colonial government, whereas other roles such as 
missionaries and their kin, and shopkeepers are not. While acknowledging the role Mhlontlo 
played in saving his life, he also impressed that Hope and his colleagues were killed as part of 
Mhlontlo’s fight against the government. Here again Mhlontlo was given agency and reason 
for killing Hope and his colleagues. It was the kind of inscription that fixed Mhlontlo in the 
category of blood-thirsty savagery that can be useful in generalizing the notion of his 
perceived resistance and that of his fellow traditional leaders. 
 
The Davis report inscribed and fixed Mhlontlo as a cunning and dangerous killer who need 
no provocation to commit murder. If there was anything about the Davis report, it was a 
narrative that set the tone for fixing Mhlontlo as a killer who employed the ability of his 
subjects to kill Hope. “It is my sad and painful duty to have the honor of reporting for the 
information of the Government that Messrs. Hope, Warrene and Henman were brutally 
murdered by Mpondomise under the Chief Mhlontlo on the 23rd.”26 The report did not 
problematize the innocence of Hamilton Hope but firmly demonstrates the power Mhlontlo 
exerts on his subjects. Mhlontlo was able to allow Hope and his colleagues to be killed and 
                                                          
24 Ibid 
25 Ibid 
26 Ibid 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 20 
 
prevent Davis from sharing the same fate. In his report, Davis addressed Hamilton Hope as 
Mr. Hope and King Mhlontlo as Mhlontlo. While Mhlontlo was a traditional leader of 
elevated status in his report Davis treated him as one that did not have any such status.  But 
he consistently registered the status of Hamilton Hope. The report indicated signs of ordering 
and categorization of the African as devoid of authority and standing. In fact, Mhlontlo is 
completely dismissed as a political figure in the text of the colonial archive. 
 
In the report that Davis sent to Umthatha about the death of Hamilton Hope, he offers an 
account of a colonial official who was an eyewitness. The report set out the account of the 
occurrences on the day of the death of Hope and the purported savagery of Mhlontlo and 
amaMpondomise. Historians such as Christopher Saunders, Clifton Crais, Sean Redding and 
J.C. Macquarie, draw on the account of the report with little or no attention to the subtle 
symptoms of colonial power detectable in the description. Hastily seeking to access the report 
as an original document that documented the occurrences of 23rd October 1880, several 
scholars mined the archive to entrench Davis’ claims without sufficient questioning. This was 
what Ann Stoler questioned about her fellow anthropologists, the digging of the archive for 
original documents and the use of such documents without problematizing them for the 
presuppositions and the implications thereof.27 The question that this raises is how precisely 
does the discipline of history come to suspect a colonial text. Here the question is whether 
something beyond a treatment of the text as hostile witness is necessary. It is the question, as 
Premesh Lalu’s Deaths of Hintsa asks about the reliability and liability of the colonial 
archive. 
 
                                                          
27 Stoler L.A., Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009), pp 3 – 19. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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The problem of mining the archive for evidence without a protocol of reading that is 
disclosed often leads to a reinforcement of colonial understandings of what was recorded in 
the carefully selected documents that were domesticated in the archive.28  
 
Joe Majija writing in the wake of the Nhlapo Commission recently revisited the archive in an 
attempt to validate a claim of Loyiso Matiwane to kingship and to recover the voice of 
Mhlontlo and amaMpondomise on the question of the death of Hamilton Hope. Drawing 
from the colonial archive Joe Majija offered a different account of the reasons behind the 
killing of Hope as he reflected on the submission of the kingship claim to the Nhlapo 
Commission by amaMpondomise. According to Majija, Hope forced the hand of Mhlontlo 
who did not want to go to war while grieving the loss of his great wife – a quite different take 
on the situation to what can be seen in the letter Davis wrote or the work of subsequent 
historians.29 
 
Majija drew from conversations between Matanga, one of Hope’s policemen, and Mhlontlo 
on the eve of the death of Hamilton Hope. 
 
Matanga, who was a policeman, was also a member of Hope’s party that left for 
Sulenkama on the 20th October 1880, said that together with Warrene he was sent 
back to Qumbu ‘to carry out certain instructions from Hope and rejoined Mr. Hope on 
the following day’. According to Matanga when he arrived at Sulenkama to rejoin the 
group he found Mhlontlo with about 30 people. He had a conversation with Mhlontlo 
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during the night. Matanga said Mhlontlo asked him, ‘What did he think of the 
expedition against the Basotho and remarked that the Basotho carried tremendous 
axes with which they could cut a man’s head off and sending it rolling and also server 
a horse’s back – ‘I replied that we’ll meet them when they come and that their tactics 
will not prevail against the British forces.’30 
 
Majija recovered the voice of Mhlontlo through a conversation between Mhlontlo and 
Matanga who was a policeman under Hamilton Hope. They entered in a discussion about the 
expedition against the neighboring Basotho people particularly attending to their weaponry, 
ability, tactics and courage in relation to British forces. The conversation between Mhlontlo 
and Matanga is extremely suggestive: 
 
Matanga further said that Mhlontlo’s reply was ‘it was all very well to say that 
you will see. I am going because I am forced against my wish. I ought not to 
go as I am in mourning for my wife – Chief Kreli’s [King Sarhili’s] daughter 
(Mamarile). I had deputised my uncle Gxumisa to take charge of my men in 
the expedition but Mr. Hope insisted upon my going’.31 
 
The conversation is useful in understanding Mhlontlo’s predicament under the circumstances. 
Matanga’s account brought to sharp contrast Mhlontlo’s version of the circumstances that 
surrounded him. His personal condition of losing a wife on the one hand and that he had to 
grieve for her bore heavily on him. On the other hand, magistrate Hope insisted that Mhlontlo 
must go to war at the same time. This suggested that Mhlontlo had to ignore his personal loss 
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and focus on the duty that was presented to him by his magistrate.32 The call to duty and 
paying respect to the British priorities over his individual and personal loss came into sharp 
focus in this account by Matanga.33 Such an account was generally absent in the work of 
historians who have written about the death of Hope and the issues that surrounded the event. 
Here Majija shows that Mhlontlo was put under tremendous pressure from magistrate Hope 
who wanted him to go to war and set aside his personal loss. Although Mhlontlo made 
alternative arrangements by putting Gxumisa in charge of his forces, Hope insisted that 
Mhlontlo must lead amaMpondomise to war. 
 
The Davis report recorded that on the eve of the death of magistrate Hamilton Hope, 
Mhlontlo got into a long conversation with Hope during dinner. 
 
On the morrow (Friday) about Four Hundred armed men collected with Mhlonhlo 
(sic) and Mr. Hope addressed a few words to them telling them why they were there, 
and that those were willing to accompany him and Mhlonhlo to fight against 
Mugwayi’s Basotos would be enrolled, and that he wished them make as much haste 
as possible, as it was necessary that a forward move be made at once; Mhlonhlo said 
that as all his men were not present he wished the enrollment postponed till the 
following day, this was agreed upon, and Mhlonhlo and his brother Mtshiki with four 
men took dinner with us that evening, during which Mr. Hope has a long conversation 
with Mhlonhlo telling him he wished to push on to Mr. Rutters where he has arranged 
to meet Mr. Thomson, Resident Magistrate of Maclear District, and some Barkly 
Volunteers.34 
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Mhlontlo made the necessary arrangements of organizing men who had to accompany Hope 
as he went to war, a sign that Mhlontlo yielded to British pressure even if he might not go 
personally. However, Hope decided to have a long conversation with Mhlontlo, Mtshiki and 
four other men “telling him [Mhlontlo] he wished to push on to Mr. Rutters where he had 
arranged to meet his fellow magistrate, Mr. Thomson, and some Barkly Volunteers.35 The 
question of a “long conversation” however suggests a sense of reluctance to actively pursue 
the expedition on the part of Mhlontlo. Given Matanga’s account Mhlontlo must have been 
telling Hope how his situation changed since their last meeting as a result of death in his wife. 
Majija argues that Mhlontlo said “I am going because I am forced against my wish. I ought 
not to go as I am in mourning for my wife.”36 
 
The “long conversation” and the account that Mhlontlo was reluctant to go because of death 
in the family were recorded as issues for consideration. However, contributing to the “long 
conversation” could be what Majija allotted to Rev. Adonis account that follows: 
 
A certain Rev. Adonis who was living at Sulenkama visited the camp at Sulenkama 
on a certain Thursday and Friday in October 1880. He confirms that he saw Mhlontlo 
and many of his people there. The people had a war dance in the afternoon…I heard 
previously that there was going to be a general uprising of the national and I spoke to 
Mhlontlo and told him what I had heard. He denied that he was going to fight against 
the Government as he is at peace and his children were living peacefully. I also 
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advised Mr. Hope by letter of these rumours. I suspected treachery and that is why I 
went to Sulenkama to warn Mr. Hope and I did so in Mr. Davis ‘presence.’ 37 
 
According to Majija, Rev. Adonis suggested that he “suspected treachery”. The reverend 
made use of the rumors that circulated about an uprising against the “Government” and acted 
on them. It was for this reason that he took it upon himself to write to Hope and also went to 
see him personally in the camp while at Sulenkama and warned him about it.38 Adonis’ 
account has strong similarity with what Davis reported about when he said “Mr. Hope 
advised us all to take our revolvers, adding that he did not feel at all satisfied and was very 
suspicious that some foul play was being carried on.”39 Davis went a step further to associate 
Mhlontlo with the rumors when he wrote about what Mhlontlo said and did; “I am going 
aside to inform Sunduza (myself) [Davis] the words which I wish Mr. Hope ‘to say’ Mhlontlo 
then led me out of the ring and when about ten yards away we stood…[he told me] he had 
saved my life through my Father being one of the oldest missionaries, and my Brother (Revd. 
W.S. Davis) being their missionary. That he (Mhlontlo) was fighting only against the 
Government”. Here Davis made a very powerful and telling association between Mhlontlo 
and the death of the colonial officials at Sulenkama. 
 
Mhlontlo was “fighting only against the Government” according to Davis. Majija also brings 
this association closer when he records “Vantye (Tanye) Booi”, an account that says: 
 
Mr. Hope was talking to Mhlontlo through Mr. Davis as interpreter. When Mhlontlo 
and Mr. Hope had been talking I heard Mr. Hope saying, ‘I am only a Government 
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servant and must do the Government’s work. Mhlontlo turned then to his people and 
said in a loud voice in kafir (which I understand) ‘There is your God. I am only a 
dog’. After this he took Davis by the arm and led him out of the ring.’40 
 
Vantye (Tantye) Booi suggested that Davis had enough language proficiency to facilitate 
talks between Mhlontlo and Hope. He suggested that “Mr. Hope was talking to Mhlontlo 
through Mr. Davis as interpreter.”41 In his account Booi suggested that Mhlontlo said Hope is 
“God” and he Mhlontlo is “only a dog” as a way of inciting amaMpondomise into killing 
Hope. This was a devastating blow to Mhlontlo in that it brought his words more closely to a 
direct instruction for the killing of magistrate Hope. It also ties in with what Davis reports as 
Mhlontlo’s contention. That Hope was quoted as saying he was “the servant of the 
Government” by Booi and that of Davis saying Mhlontlo was “fighting against the 
Government.”42 
 
Contesting the will and witness of the colonial officer 
 
In the Davis report Mhlontlo was responsible for the death of the colonial officials. But Rev. 
Adonis argued that Mhlontlo refused to be associated with such violence. Majija suggested 
that Adonis’ conversation with Mhlontlo suggested a denial. He (Rev Adonis) said “I heard 
previously that there was going to be a general uprising of the nation and I spoke to Mhlontlo 
and told him what I had heard. He denied that he was going to fight against the Government 
as he was at peace and his children were living peacefully.”43 If as Louise White argues that 
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there were reasons for the fabrication of the rumors, and that these have consequences for 
how we write histories, we need to read the implications of rumors.44 
 
It was interesting that in Booi’s account Mhlontlo was suggested as responsible for Hope’s 
death. This is the same person who understood what he called the “kafir language” under 
oath, while Davis who interpreted for Mhlontlo and Hope did not report in that manner. The 
time difference between Booi’s sworn statement and that of Davis’ was vast and could 
suggest an altering of how people remembered things. Majija continued to bring to the fore 
more witnesses who used similar words in their accounts of what Mhlontlo said to 
amaMpondomise. For instance, Tetani and Gxoyiya also gave accounts about what Mhlontlo 
said to the people. 
 
Tetani, who was living in Qumbu at the time, had hired out a wagon and a span of oxen to 
Hamilton Hope to transport provisions for Hope’s contingent to Sulenkama…Mhlontlo stood 
out in front of Mr. Hope and called for silence.  As soon as silence had been restored 
Mhlontlo said, ‘Listen to me Pondomise.  There is your chief (pointing to Mr. Hope) whose 
orders you are now to take, who has closed the door against the Baca and Pondos, you are 
now fat and don’t have to sleep in the veldt in fear of your enemies.  You all know I am still 
in mourning.  Gxumisa will lead you’ Mhlontlo and Davis left the ring.45 
 
Majija continued to explore the statements of eyewitnesses on the day. He brought in 
Gxoyiya’s statement about what Mhlontlo said to AmaMpondomise before he left the 
presence of Hope. 
 
                                                          
44 Louise White, Speaking with Vampires: Rumours and History in colonial Africa, (California: University of 
California Press, 2000) 
45 Joe Majija, Dark Clouds at Sulenkama a true story, (Umthatha: 2009), p18 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 28 
 
Referring to this very moment Gxoyiya says ‘On reaching there (the inner circle) all 
went inside with the exception of Mhlontlo who remained a little behind the rest and 
at the opening of the circle.  Mr. Hope sat down.  UMhlontlo then address to people 
and said. ‘There is your chief, you must look after him.  I can’t go on this expedition 
because I am in mourning.  That is your man (meaning Mr. Hope) that has protected 
you against your enemy.46 
 
The two accounts of Tetani and Gxoyiya were similar but they varied with that of Booi who 
claimed to understand the language spoken by Mhlontlo when addressing amaMpondomise. 
Booi argued that Mhlontlo said Hope is “God and that he Mhlontlo is “only a dog” in 
comparison. This statement suggests a condescending reference to Mhlontlo while elevating 
Hope in an unnecessary manner and had enough implications for inciting violence.  However, 
Tetani, “who was living in Qumbu at the time, had hired out a wagon and a span of oxen for 
Hamilton Hope to transport provisions” and Gxoyiya who was in the company of Hope from 
Qumbu said something different.47 Majija further argues that “Booi has been left at the camp 
and had been instructed by Hope to saddle up the horses.”48 All these contradicting accounts 
were used as evidence in the trial of Mhlontlo in 1904 where the court did not find him guilty 
of the murder of Hamilton Hope but deposed him and destroyed his kingdom for good.  
 
Majija invokes the words that were used by two key contributors to the destruction of the 
kingdom of amaMpondomise namely Mr. T. Welsh and Colonel Stanford. The two alluded to 
the end of the kingdom based on the basis of the killing of Hope. To begin with, Welsh wrote 
a memorandum addressed to the Secretary of Native affairs in the 1920s where he stated: 
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In 1915, on the death of Mhlontlo who treacherously murdered his Magistrate and two 
other officials at Qumbu in October 1880, an application for the revival of the 
Chieftainship was made by the Pondomise and refused on the grounds (1) that 
Mhlontlo destroyed ‘by his own act’ the chieftainship (2) that under no circumstances 
would the chieftainship be revived and (3) that it would be a mistake to go back on 
the considered policy of the past 30 years.49  
 
The Welsh memorandum suggested that the colonial office was tightly gripped through the 
policy argument that was in circulation for 30 years. It appears that Welsh remained firm on 
the principle that the Mhlontlo kingdom must be utterly and permanently destroyed. He 
highlighted three significant grounds for such refusal that implicated Mhlontlo in the murder 
of Hope even though the memorandum was written after the not guilty verdict was passed in 
the King Williamstown court in 1904. The colonial state considered Mhlontlo guilty of the 
murder of Hope regardless of lack of evidence that directly linked Mhlontlo to the act. But 
Welsh stated that “by his own act” which suggested that Mhlontlo had an active role in the 
death of Hope whereas the court verdict implied otherwise. The policy rationale was that 
“under no circumstances would the chieftainship” of Mhlontlo and his descendants be 
revived and that that policy was intact for 30 years already by then. 
 
The second and last role player was Colonel Stanford who uttered a direct statement in a 
meeting held between Brownlee who was Chief Magistrate to East Griqualand in November 
1881 and amaMpondomise. Stanford indicated that: 
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Had Hope not been killed, Charles Mhlontlo would have been your Chief today. You 
killed more than one man that day. You killed Mhlontlo. You killed Charles. You 
killed all Mhlontlo’s descendants. You killed all the fruit of his loins into the last 
generation.50  
 
Stanford did not mince his words about who killed Hope. He simply asserted as fact that the 
amaMpondomise killed Hope. But he still punished Mhlontlo for an act he did not commit. It 
was in the Stanford statement that a direct link between the death of Hope and the permanent 
destruction of amaMpondomise kingdom was made. He claimed that the killing of Hope had 
direct consequences for Mhlontlo’s descendants into the last generation. 
 
Chapter Two 
 
Nhlapo Commission: A Whig History recast 
 
In October 2004, the second post-apartheid state president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, 
established an independent commission of enquiry to investigate all claims and disputes of 
traditional leadership in South Africa.51 In so doing, it seemed that Mbeki mandated and 
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shifted the responsibility from his office to the Nhlapo Commission to deal with all the 
issues, claims, counter-claims and disputes that related to and affected the institution of 
traditional leaders. This act, on the part of Mbeki, devolved the powers of his office to the 
commission to act on behalf of the state to investigate and finalize kingship claims and 
counter claims that were the order of the day. Such kingship claims and counter claims were 
matters related to traditional authorities not dealt with substantially during the political 
transition negotiation process of the early 1990s in South Africa. The mandate included 
giving a report with recommendations to the state for implementation.  
 
In this chapter, I will argue that by establishing the commission on claims and disputes of 
traditional leaders, Mbeki wittingly or unwittingly set in motion a binary of backwardness 
and progress in a context that complicated the meaning of whether South Africa was to be 
figured as a postcolonial or a specifically post-apartheid question.52 The binary that presented 
and represented the state as staking a claim to progressive political thought and leadership as 
opposed to stagnant, rigid and archaic systems of rule represented by traditional leadership 
was one of the core questions that had been deferred in the negotiation process. The transition 
and the negotiation process tended to lack in addressing the rural question as one about 
governmentality. The two terms taken together to refer to state policy shifts that were 
inspired by affording all the inhabitants of South African, not some, rights and liberties that 
marked discontinuity with repressive apartheid policies. In that way the state seemed to 
represent an ever moving liberal and a more progressive political environment as against a 
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stagnant and less democratic institution of traditional leadership. The question of how the 
commission on the claims and disputes of traditional leaders came about, its purpose and its 
dealings with the institution of traditional leadership brushed up against a concept of history 
that for all intents and purposes appeared to invoke a Whig conception of history, recast in 
South Africa undergoing a democratic transition.53 
 
That the commission was set up by the state to investigate the institution of traditional 
leadership was indicative of the politics of progress, progressive societal rights and liberties 
acting against supposedly rigid backward archaic tendencies and royal prerogative. 54 Such 
politics sought to elevate the state as the arch advocate of liberties and as a champion of 
universal suffrage and the sole arbiter in the ambit of conflict resolution. To this extent the 
setting up of the commission made no provision for the argument that the question of rights 
may have indeed entered the space of rural disputes where traditional authorities exercised 
their powers in apartheid South Africa. In this way the state through its commission was 
presented as the last port of call in validating the legitimacy of traditional leadership claims 
and disputes about who had an authentic claim to kingship and who was not, thus 
representing the institution of traditional leadership as incapable of resolving its own matters 
about the highest position in the hierarchy of traditional authorities. In the reckoning of the 
state, traditional authority was seen as derived from a pre-colonial history. For instance, when 
state president Mbeki established the commission, he effectively ushered in a binary of state 
and tradition to the life of the state, where the state had the power to investigate, arrange and 
regulate the affairs of traditional leadership on the one hand, while on the other, the 
institution of traditional leadership was presented as disordered, misaligned, chaotic, 
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illegitimate and in need of regulation. It needed to be given the hue of a modern state for it to 
function as constitutive of a post-apartheid political formation. For this reason, it appeared as 
if the state had the duty and onus to investigate the institution of traditional leadership 
through its appointed “independent commission of enquiry”. 
 
President Thabo Mbeki, an ardent advocate for the advancement of the African continent and 
a champion of “African solutions to African problems”, is widely hailed as the proponent of 
the idea of an “African Renaissance”.55 Elias Bongmba argues “that the renaissance 
imperative, as outlined by Mbeki, [was] crucial for reconfiguring the human condition in 
Africa”.56 Mbeki’s thought was important to consider in imagining and arriving at a different 
Africa from “how it was known” and how it had been constituted in relation to a colonial 
project of indirect rule in places such as South Africa. Thabo Mbeki deployed the notion of 
an African renaissance, in ways that indicated a bias towards the recognition of Africa in 
many respects. Bongmba further suggests that Mbeki’s formulation of the African 
renaissance was vital since it demanded a post-nationalist agenda that took the African 
continent seriously, it called for the revitalization of Africa’s cultural ideals, and promoted a 
new political culture.57 However, when Thabo Mbeki established the commission of enquiry 
on the claims and disputes of traditional leadership he inevitably ushered in a binary in which 
a democratic parliament was set up against traditional authority that undermined the very call 
he made in the “African Renaissance” debate that may link with the broad but mostly 
geopolitical discourse that prescribed “African solutions to African problems”.58 The 
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question of whether a traditional authority could coexist with a parliamentary democracy, 
without the decimation of traditional rule, is a question that hovered in the background. This 
idea of decimation had an earlier articulation in the African National Congress (ANC) in 
exile (Lusaka) where strong objections to the inclusion of traditional authorities in the 
constitutional proposal for a future South Africa were tabled by members of a specially 
constituted constitutional committee in 1986.59 Rather than explaining this as a product of 
compromise in the midst of a negotiated settlement, this thesis argues that the very 
compromise was defined by a concept of history drawn from an earlier tradition of the British 
Empire. 
 
The establishment of the commission brought into focus a “trail of discourse leading to and 
from” the understandings of what it meant to set up such a commission.60 In one way, Mbeki 
set up a “trail of discourse” in his deployment of phrases such as the dignity of traditional 
leaders and the integrity of traditional authorities as a justification for the commission. The 
commission and the understandings around it were mediated by a discourse of African 
Renaissance that sought to create a platform for affirming Africa as a continent capable and 
competent to run its own affairs independent of outside interventions. Mbeki also espoused 
the idea that, African solutions where African leaders and institutions used African 
approaches to African problems were key. The process of African restoration echoed by 
Mbeki collided with those who encountered the justificatory structure of the Nhlapo 
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Commission.61 This very discourse created the conditions for different interpretations of the 
commission.62 These interpretations can be gauged in the many debates about why the 
Nhlapo Commission was necessary in the aftermath of the fall of apartheid.  
 
To some scholars, when Thabo Mbeki set up the commission, he was in an interaction with 
the question of citizen and subject, and despotic arrangements inherited from late colonial 
rule.63 However, for others, Mbeki recalled to memory or brought back to life the old British 
tension between parliament and the monarchy, one that had a ripple effect in Britain and its 
colonies such as America, India and South Africa at the height of Empire.64 Together these 
interpretations reproduced and maintained the divide between a parliamentary democracy and 
monarchical rule that was the inheritance of the British Empire.65 
 
Often ignored in these interpretations is the fact that traditional leaders themselves had called 
for the questions of the future of traditional authorities at the time of CODESA negotiations. 
Chitja Twala, Buti Kompi and Jacob Selesho, drawing from email exchanges with the 
chairperson of the commission, Professor Thandabantu Nhlapo, argued that in the Kempton 
Park political negotiations, traditional leaders approached the ANC for such an enquiry.66 
This suggested a reasonable distance from the state as one responsible for the establishment 
of the commission. Their argument sought to implicate traditional leaders in the creation of 
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the commission and excused the state president for any apportioning of blame in relation to 
the commission. However, the workings of establishing this commission of enquiry recalled 
the binary that was operational in the very conception of History that underwrote the 
negotiation process and which emphasized older theories that elevated parliament above the 
monarchy. Such a conception of history argued for the idea of a progressive society that 
moved towards attaining more universal liberties and the establishment of constitutional 
democracy.67 It marked the strength of parliamentary rule as an agent of progress and the 
subjugation of the monarchy to constitutional and democratic demands of parliament.68 I will 
argue that by and large this binary of progress and tradition plagued the dealings of the post-
apartheid state through its “independent commission of enquiry” called the Nhlapo 
Commission. More importantly, it recalled the formidable, if unstated Whig idea as critical to 
understanding the transition to democracy in South Africa.  
 
Genealogical underpinnings of Whig History 
 
To enter the debate about this binary that the state used through its “Nhlapo Commission”, I 
will investigate the case of the traditional leadership claim of amaMpondomise that was 
presented to the commission to illustrate the tension between parliamentary rule and the 
institution of traditional leadership. But, first I turn to the genealogical and epistemological 
underpinnings of the “Whig tradition of history” from the seventeenth century up to the 
twentieth century that ironically, I argue, underwrote the South African transition in the 
1990s. To understand the Whig influence, I propose to return to the work of Paul Rapin de 
Thoyras in his History of England, David Hume in The History of England, Thomas 
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Babington Macaulay in The History of England from the accession of James II, and William 
Stubbs and Herbert Butterfield in The Whig Interpretation of History.69 The debate formed 
around the disagreements of these thinkers of Whiggish history offer us a new perspective on 
how to think about the ways in which the transition to democracy in South Africa perhaps 
unwittingly drew on a historiography of empire. 
 
Whig concepts of history were punctuated by a series of disagreements, agreements, 
deviations and borrowings, beginning with Paul Rapin de Thoyras in History of England 
published in 1723 who first formulated the notion of an “ancient constitution”.70 For Thoyras 
the English ruled themselves through an unwritten social contract, which he called the 
“ancient constitution”. The “ancient constitution” according to Thoyras’ deployment was a 
technology to oppose the “royal prerogative” in English parliamentary politics.71 Through the 
“ancient constitution”, Thoyras invoked the “Saxon constitution” of the Anglo-Saxon 
conquest” which brought about the “mixed government” resulting in “power [sharing] 
between the king and parliament”.72 Earlier the term ”ancient constitution” was the idea of 
Edward Coke in his compilation of law reports that marked the political and theoretical 
developments of the seventeenth century.73 While Edward Coke was considered conservative 
in his formulation and application of the term, the idea itself had become a radical shift in the 
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politics of England to oppose the firm grip of power of James I and Charles I.74 It sought to 
claim the endurance, existence and domain of common law in English politics since 1066.75 
 
The conservative British historian, Hugh Trevor Roper argued that Paul de Thoyras’ History 
of England was the classic of Whig History.76 Thoyras became an authority of the Whig 
tradition of history in the first half of the eighteenth century because he pioneered the debate 
about the relationship between monarchy and parliament.77 Other Whig historians that wrote 
in this period were seen to be subordinate to Thoyras according to Hugh Trevor-Roper. 
However, in the second half of the century, the Scotsman, David Hume rose to popularity and 
strongly differed with some of the early Whig formulations. Powerful figures of the early 
Whig history writers that added their weight in the “ancient constitution” discourse included 
Coke and de Thoyras, as well as John Locke and Thomas Hobbes. But was ultimately David 
Hume who introduced a crucial formulation that became a counter argument to the “ancient 
constitution”. It emphasized the imperative of a written constitution as direct evidence of any 
form of a “social contract”. The “social contract” emphasized in David Hume’s discourse 
indicated that a disruption occurred in that it had a later date than the one claimed by the early 
cohort of Whig writers as an “ancient constitution”. The background training of Hume 
channeled and influenced his writings. For instance, in his six volumes of The History of 
England written between 1754 and 1761, Hume leaned on the evidentiary discipline of legal 
studies by making a careful argument in favor of a “written constitution” or written “social 
contract”. 
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David Hume, who was a contemporary and a friend of François-Marie Arouet, with a pen 
name of Voltaire, a self-professed Tory historian, wrote the most explosive Whig history in 
the second half of the seventeenth century for which he got praise.78. Considering that 
Voltaire was one of the foremost scholars of his time, praise from him affirmed Hume and 
positioned him as being part of the leading scholars at the time. Okie argued that the extent of 
Hume’s opposition to early Whig formulations advanced by the likes of Locke, Hobbes, 
Coke and de Thoyras inspired him to write History of England wherein he vehemently 
refuted the notion of an ancient constitution probably because he was closely associated with 
the disciplinary standards of the evidentiary discipline of Law.79 Drawing from Duncan 
Forbes, Okie suggested that Hume not only wanted to discredit the “shibboleths” of the 
“ancient constitution” but also to bring to life a historical work of “political moderation”.80 
Instead of the political disunity that was presented in the past, his work attempted to bring 
about and work towards a rallying point for the unity of thought among the politically and 
ideologically divided proponents that tore the state asunder.81 While he was one of the 
celebrated historians of Whig tradition of history, Hume was not without limitations. For 
example, he could firstly not present and represent the Whig history in its entirety and satisfy 
all the competing sides. Secondly, he was trapped in telling a linear story and one that 
focused on those who led and not those who supported the cause from a distance. While his 
work was questioned, it resurfaced in the twentieth century with considerable force.  
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Laird Okie, however, omitted the role of Henry Fox from the politics of Whig history, father 
of Charles James Fox. The Fox combination of father and son proved politically influential in 
the Whig parliament for most of the seventeenth century. Henry Fox was a promising 
member of the Whigs who rose in the early eighteenth century but never reached the 
anticipated zenith of his political development of becoming a prime minister because of his 
opposition to the crown.82 Henry Fox played his political part in the British parliament since 
1705 right through the second half of the eighteenth century. He also introduced an 
aristocratic arrangement in the Whig history when he bought a seat in parliament for his son, 
Charles James Fox, in 1748 remaining active in parliament for 38 years. In omitting Henry 
Fox, Okie missed inserting the aristocratic arrangement that powered the Fox family in the 
parliamentary politics of England. She also missed to show that this same family occupied 
the “cultural capital” and played a significant role in the structure of Whig / English politics 
through their long political and commercial involvement. The two Foxes overlapped the 
period of David Hume’s writing of The History of England, which strengthened the Whig 
position in the British parliament. This suggested that Okie omitted them not by default but 
by design, however, she shortchanged herself. I argue that the omission of the Foxes 
compromised the study on Hume because at a later stage Charles Fox pushed the Whig 
position in parliament to impeach King George III. “Whereas the early years had seen 
[Charles] Fox and [Richard] Sheridan playing a prominent role in the impeachment” where 
even King George III felt the sting of impeachment albeit in proximity under the lead of 
Charles James Fox in the company of Edward Burke, Richard Sheridan and Philip Francis.83 
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Okie’s omission of the Foxes and emphasis on Hume missed one of the most crucial 
moments in the Whig / Tory relationship in the British parliament; that of the impeachment 
campaign against king George III. Their contribution questioned the traditional role of the 
monarchy in British politics, which Nelson Mandela claimed to admire during his Revonia 
trial representations.  
 
Butterfield has suggested that Charles James Fox advanced an idea that the king, George III, 
was a threat to the constitution, and that ridding him of the position by impeachment would 
serve the country well. Charles James Fox admired the movements and the achievements of 
the French Revolution had impetus in his Whig beliefs. That impact of the repercussions of 
the French Revolution in Fox’s life remained even at the breaking point of the party and his 
relationship with Edward Burke, a situation that suggested a unity of opposites, where the 
Whig theory held together people of different persuasions.84 But their influence weakened in 
the nineteenth century after Thomas Babington Macaulay published The History of England 
from the accession of James II. That specific text emphasized the exponential growth of 
England. Macaulay proceeded from multiple efforts and initiatives like the commerce, slave 
trade, and the expansion of the empire that were made under the British flag.85 Macaulay 
elevated the British empire and emphasized the role of the crown and further elaborated the 
trope of enlightenment, which projected British achievements of a mixed parliamentary 
system, a gigantic commerce, and notable empire as superseding any nation on the face of the 
planet. The intentions of Macaulay conform to the more recent observations of Catherine Hall 
in her introduction to Cultures of empire a reader: Colonizers in Britain and the empire in 
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the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which offers an outlook that at first appears like the 
familiar civilizing mission, but in the colonies it was an effort to export a form of government 
in which a place for monarchy was secured.  
 
In the introduction of his book The History of England from the Accession of James II, 
Macaulay engaged a discourse that revealed that the commercial, military, naval and 
expansionist efforts by the British helped to produce a mighty empire whose head was the 
monarch.86 In Macaulay’s book there was a strange shift in language and meanings about the 
role of the monarch in British affairs. From a generally anti-monarch British sentiment, 
Macaulay moved to the other extreme of embracing the monarch as the head of British 
representation in empire. It might well be that the work of David Hume and the slowly 
shifting and improved relations between the crown and parliament influenced the writings of 
Macaulay. He writes: “I [propose] to write the history of England from the accession of king 
James the Second down to a time which is within the memory of men still living”.87 Here 
Macaulay chose to engage the history of England deploying a teleological discourse and he 
forcefully made the point starting from the beginning of the English monarchy. He proposed 
to establish a teleological link in his contribution to the structure of English history and 
English thought which afforded him an avenue to English cultural capital in the age of 
empire. 
 
In recent years, scholars such as Edward Said and Giorgio Agamben returned to the problem 
of teleology in history, questioning the kinds of historical discourses that ensue with Plato, 
Aristotle, Saint Augustine, Hegel and Marx, as well as Macaulay on the thesis of time and 
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history.88 These intellectuals and critics are particularly interested in the question of time as it 
functions in relation to a sense of progress and progression and its entanglement in the 
discourse of history and colonization. In this regard, recent scholars have implicated the 
discipline of history formed around a notion of teleological time that facilitated how people 
of conquered regions and continents came to be known and therefore colonized.89 Knowledge 
was integral to colonization. Said argued that European culture concerned itself with the 
study, development and production of knowledge about the colonies and central to his 
position was that this “culture was able to manage - and even produce – the [colonized] 
politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively during the 
post-Enlightenment period”.90 
 
Giorgio Agamben asks how “time” came to be understood in the telling of history by arguing 
that the likes of Plato, Aristotle, Saint Augustine, Hegel and Marx and even Macaulay, 
deployed the notion in particular ways in their thought. Agamben argues that the early 
scholars paid close attention to the relationship of time, the past, the present and the future, 
where the past was long lasting, the present was a short period and a future that was ever 
coming to unfold. Agamben also argues that this conception of “time” remained entangled in 
history since the period of Greek thought and that it endured well into modern thought, albeit 
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unproblematized. From there it was infused into Marxist thought and in the production of 
history, unabated.91 
 
This teleological perspective, for instance, can be seen in Macaulay’s efforts to narrate the 
history of Britain not only as one of progress, but of progress that accommodates tradition. 
Macaulay’s view of time and progress sets out his intended purpose of ordering the publics of 
Scotland and England through his carefully arranged work: 
 
I shall trace the course of that revolution which terminated the long struggle between our 
sovereigns and their parliaments, and bound up together the rights of the people and the title 
of the reigning dynasty. I shall relate how the new settlement was, during many troubled 
years, successfully defended against foreign and domestic enemies; how, under that 
settlement, the authority of law and the security of property found to be compatible with a 
liberty of discussion and of individual action never before known92 
 
Here Macaulay set the scene for his teleological account of the British empire and its 
founding tension between the monarch and the institution of parliament. He argued that the 
tension was long and was primarily “bound up together [with] the rights of the people and the 
title of the reigning dynasty”. Macaulay brought the old Whig /Tory tension that 
characterized the political life of Britain in the age of empire, to life. Again he intended to 
make clear a progressive link as the British polity unfolded. However, he buttressed the idea 
of a settlement, which was an agreement to split roles between the monarchy and parliament. 
In his thought the settlement was pivotal in the making of Britain and that developed into an 
unimaginable empire the world over. 
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Macaulay continued to mark Britain and its established institutions as peculiar from the rest 
of the nations of the world. He went on to argue that: 
 
from the auspicious union of order and freedom, sprang a prosperity of which the annals of 
human affairs had furnished no example; how our country, from the state of ignominious 
vassalage, rapidly rose to the place of empire among European powers; how her opulence and 
her martial glory grew together; how, by wise and resolute good faith, was gradually 
established a public credit fruitful of marvels which to the  statesmen of any former age 
would have seemed incredible; how a gigantic commerce gave birth to a maritime power, 
compared with which every other maritime power, ancient or modern, sinks into 
insignificance; how Scotland, after ages of enmity, was at length united to England, not 
merely by legal bonds, but by indissoluble ties of interest and affection; how, in America, the 
British colonies rapidly became far mightier and wealthier than the realms which Cortes and 
Pizarro had added to the dominions of Charles the Fifth; how in Asia, British adventurers 
founded an empire not less splendid and more durable than that of Alexander.93 
 
Macaulay introduced a discourse of a “revolution” and suggested that the British order 
arrived at a tipping point after long, protracted and bitter struggles between the “sovereigns 
and parliament”.94 A revolution in the order of proceeding with how the British managed 
their affairs suggested a complete change in how they arranged their social structures. He did 
so by opening an avenue as he developed his argument and said the “revolution … terminated 
the long struggle between our sovereigns and their parliaments”.95 The revolutionary moment 
he projected suggested a notion of a turning point in the history of his nation, a notion that 
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was synonymous with modernity and the tradition of modern history writing.96 It was that 
notion of a turning point, while it was not fully developed as a thought by Macaulay that 
nevertheless marked one of the most important milestones in British History and the history 
of empire.     
 
Keeping in mind Macaulay’s idea of the empire, Uday Singh Mehta in Liberalism and 
Empire: A study in Nineteenth – Century British Liberal thought published in 1999 offers a 
platform for engaging Macaulay as he elucidates on the idea of unfamiliarity. He argues that 
by and large, the thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were generally ill 
informed about the people of the territories they occupied in the colonies of the empire based 
on unfamiliarity.97 Bearing in mind the contribution of Macaulay in liberal thought of the 
empire, Mehta is deeply concerned that Macaulay “endorsed the empire as a legitimate form 
of political and commercial governance”.98 In this regard he accepted and justified “it’s 
largely undemocratic and non-representative structure” in which the people of the occupied 
colonies were never part of what liberalism meant for the British who were in those colonies. 
Instead Macaulay encouraged and invoked “politically relevant categories such as history, 
ethnicity, civilizational hierarchies, and occasionally race and blood ties”.99 
 
Macaulay offered Whig historiography an opportunity to put progress and tradition together 
in a sequence. In other words, while Whig History supported the general idea of progress, 
Macaulay found a way to accommodate tradition in that longer story of progress. The 
difficulty for this Whig reconstruction came with the history of science, in particular the work 
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of Herbert Butterfield’s The Whig interpretation of History published in 1931.100 Butterfield 
made room for an interpretation that used other disciplines beyond history, arguing that Whig 
history was over-invested in the discipline of history. His writing in 1931 brought the history 
of science to bear on the broader discipline of history. Nick Jardine’s ‘Whigs and stories: 
Herbert Butterfield and the historiography of science’ suggests that Butterfield was first and 
foremost a historian of science. For Jardine, “as Chairman of the Cambridge History of 
Science Committee, [Butterfield] played an important role in the consolidation of the subject 
as an academic discipline in the post-WWII years.”101 
 
What Butterfield achieved was to question the notion of continuity that had underwritten 
Whig History. He did that by placing on record three questions. He discredited “narratives of 
triumphal progress that structured research topics” as early as the 1930s. Second, Butterfield 
called into question “historical transitions” in which he “opposed the Whig privileging of 
‘friends of progress’ as agents of continuous development”.102 Third, the problem for 
Butterfield was “the one concerning the methods, scope and uses of history”, where he 
problematized how history was interpreted to suit particular notions of “grand theory”.103 
 
More recently, E.P. Thompson enters the debate by drawing from Michel Foucault who was 
chair of History in France in 1960, in his argument that Michel Foucault “offer[ed] a new 
way of thinking about history, writing history and deploying history in current political 
struggles”,104 which made many historians, especially Americans and English, critical of his 
discourses on history. “Many American and British historians have received Foucault's books 
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not as the development of a new theory of history and not even as the work of an empirical 
historian, but rather as an attack on the discipline of history”.105 Thompson thought that “for 
Foucault, history is a form of knowledge and a form of power at the same time. Put 
differently, it is a means of controlling and domesticating the past in the form of knowing it. 
The historian pretends to recreate the past”106 Foucault addressed himself to the deception of 
writing history along these line and the imposed power of the authors of histories, who made 
believe that histories and their authors had no power relations with those who received their 
texts. He sought to insert the idea of discontinuing with the established and unmediated trend 
of power that flowed from authors to publics and states that are ordered by these means.  
 
On the issue of discontinuity, Thompson’s reflections on the work of Foucault suggests that 
historians tended to make illegitimate claims about knowing the past, they embodied it in 
their writings, positioned themselves as conduits of the past while concealing the aspect of 
power that invested their discourse as a result of such claim. 
 
 What is at issue is the act of an individual claiming to contain within his or her 
consciousness a certain truth about the past and representing it in writing. Foucault does not 
claim that such an effort is impossible or illegitimate, but that this operation is an active, 
willful working on materials. It is a creation, a fiction, in the full sense of the term. 
Positivists, liberals, and Marxists alike have practiced it. Furthermore, it produces a discourse 
with a set of meanings that acts upon everyone who comes into contact with it. Historical 
writing, Foucault contends, is a practice that has effects, and these effects tend, whatever 
one's political predisposition, to erase the difference of the past and justify a certain version 
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of the present. And finally, the practice of the discourse of the past places the historian in a 
privileged position: as the one who knows the past, the historian has power. The historian 
becomes an intellectual who presides over the past, nurtures it, develops it, and controls it. 
Since, under the thesis of continuity, the historian is able to collect within him or herself the 
experience of the past, he or she has an ideological interest in maintaining its importance, 
reasserting the inevitability with which the past leads to the present, while at the same time 
denying that there is a certain power at stake.107 
 
Michel Foucault’s work dealt historians of progress a blow because he presented a thesis of 
discontinuity. His main target was the sponsored idea of a past that was inevitably linked with 
the present.  “Foucault's critique of the epistemology of historical practice [was] clarified and 
reveal[ed] its importance when it [was] brought to bear on those historical schools that 
present[ed] themselves consciously as advocates of progress”.108 
 
Thompson deployed the work of Foucault to critique histories of progress like historical 
materialism and Whig history. Foucault was a contemporary of Jacques Derrida and a fellow 
deconstructionist who was chair of history in France. He came up with a formulation of 
“discontinuity” through his concept of difference that was again resulted in a particular 
problematization of the concept of time inherited through the discourse of history. American 
and British historians particularly isolated him as a result. Derrida, like Foucault, addressed 
himself to the notion of disentangling time, progress and the past from the present; these 
being the key features of the discourse of enlightenment and modernity. Enlightenment and 
modernity were favored vehicles that catapulted the rise of America and Britain to the central 
                                                          
107 ibid  
108 ibid  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 50 
 
stage of historical thought as keenly presented and represented by their scholars. It was 
against this background that both Derrida and Foucault implicitly questioned and discredited 
the centrality of enlightenment notions of Whig history and historical materialism of the 
Marxist theory. French scholars beheaded the king. British historians, for the better part, did 
not. The exception to that rule defined Marxist engagements with Whig history. 
 
Marxist engagement with Whig History 
 
Fully aware of the Whig traditions in writing the history of Britain the Marxist historian 
Christopher Hill wrote about the English Revolution of 1640. Published in 1940 and later 
transcribed by Andy Blunden in 2002, details how in 1640 the English parliament beheaded 
the British king Charles I in public.109 Hill compares the English revolution to the French 
revolution. In fact he argues that the revolution was a “great social movement” that was 
complex in its nature.110 The often cited leaders of the revolution like Charles I, Cromwell, 
Hume, George III, Fox and Macaulay for instance, according to Hill, represented a group of 
the elite classes like the landlords and members of parliament who appealed to the support of 
traders and industrialists, ”the yeomen and progressive gentry and the wider masses”.111 
While the English revolution may be seen as a genuine tilt in favor of the poor, it constituted 
a victory of self-government for the wealthier middle and upper classes. The majority of 
English people were reduced to poverty as a result of a new capitalist order that tilted the 
scales in society.112 
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Hill argues that the English Revolution was a tension, conflict and a struggle waged for 
political, economic and religious power whose central proponents were the middle class and 
the bourgeoisie at the time of the rise of liberalism and exponential wealth accrued from the 
development of capitalism. These classes and influences struggled against the monarch 
Charles I who represented noble landowners who were supported by a “court clique of 
aristocratic commercial racketeers” that accrued benefit from tax impositions and public 
funds.113 To this end, the claims by Charles I before the court which sentenced him to death 
that he spoke not for himself alone but for the liberty of all his subjects since he was their 
king, were not true. His interests were “not of the common people at all”.114 Here the British 
parliament successfully dislodged the authority of the monarchy in the affairs of their 
country. By relocating the central causes of the English Revolution, Hill and other Marxist 
historians displaced the question that had guided the Whig debate. In the hands of Marxist 
historians, the question of the struggle between monarchy and parliament was laid to rest by 
historical means. But the peace made in Britain did not follow that which was to follow in the 
former colonies of the British empire, where the division between monarchy and parliament 
that had been exported to the colonies as a story of citizen and subject affirmed the 
continuous struggle between monarchy and parliament. 
 
While the matter was settled in the British historiography, in South Africa it reared its head at 
the time of the transition. In the South African transition, the trace of the tension between 
monarchy and parliament becomes apparent when one threads the debates in South Africa 
through the grids of British historiography and places it in relation to the convening of the 
Nhlapo Commission into the role of traditional leaders. In South Africa, the constitutional 
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parliament initially sought to dislodge and subject the remains of the monarchy to South 
African laws, which cut the monarchy off from the organs of state power. For instance, the 
Constitution of 1996 and the Traditional Leadership Framework Act of 2003 consistently 
position the monarchy as being subject to customary law and the Bill of Rights, which are the 
essential elements of the Constitution. But after several years, the claims of traditional leaders 
resurfaced, suggesting that the matter was far from resolved. It is in this resurfacing that we 
see the recall of a Whig concept of history to resolve and African problem. 
 
In the South African situation, which is a former colony of Britain and currently a capitalist 
economy in a democratic dispensation, the monarchy is completely subjected to the supreme 
law of the land and operates in parliament through a national house of traditional leadership 
which reports to a minister in the cabinet. Similarities notwithstanding, there is some 
difference from the developments of the English Revolution in Britain where the monarchy 
suffered a literal death of a reigning king and that the feudal system was curtailed and the 
voice that supported the monarch was silenced for a short while in which historical narration 
played a crucial role.  
 
Common concerns between the British revolution and the South African transformation 
epochs are issues of land and land ownership, trade and industry as well as the political role 
of the monarchy in both countries. Britain moved from feudalism to capitalism whereas 
South Africa moved from a liberal to a neo-liberal economic set up. For instance Hill 
suggests that owing to the developments of the sixteenth century of the discovery of silver in 
America and the settler arrangement there, land ownership in England became competitive 
even for the monarchy and the bishops.115 This cut through the feudal system of the time and 
                                                          
115Ibid, p 8. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 53 
 
pushed boundaries in the economic system of hand to mouth production. “Landowners 
controlled local government” and “[o]nly gentlemen were elected by their fellow landowners 
to represent the country in parliament”.116 Representation in the British parliament at the time 
was marked by elitism to advocate for the interests of the represented classes which embraced 
capitalism.117 Because the laws were old and never accommodated the capitalist order radical 
changes were pushed in parliament to favor capitalism but growing displeasure of forced 
labor, landlessness and bad treatment inflated the anger of the affected classes against the 
crown. 
 
The unity of the poor and the richer classes against the crown seem to be identical and all 
embracing. However, Hill suggests that the industrial expansion, the dictates of price 
increases, the expansion of export goods and the coal mining increased the stakes for the 
capitalist in seventeenth century England.118 The power of capital grew and ordered the 
public in a different and new way, while the crown sought to maintain the old order 
purportedly in favor of poorer classes of feudal landlords, the crown and the landless.119 
 
Conquest, exploitation, and subjugation are old themes in world history. What was new in the 
Europe of the Enlightenment, of the development of liberalism, of the French Revolution, and 
of the classical economists was that such processes were set off against increasingly powerful 
claims in late eighteenth century political and historical discourse to universal principles as 
the basis for organizing a polity. Such claims – and competing visions of universal public 
good – were bitterly contested within Europe, not least over the questions of the social 
criteria (gender important among them) by which some groups would be included in the body 
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politic while others would not. Ruling elites trying to claim power on the basis of generalized 
citizenship and inclusive social rights were forced to confront a basic question: whether those 
principles were applicable – and to whom – in old overseas empires and in newly conquered 
territory that were now becoming the dependencies of nation-states.120 
 
Liberalism and empire 
 
Lastly I would like to pay attention to the idea of liberalism and empire as a way of dealing 
with the epistemological and genealogical elements of the Whig conception of history.121 
Catherine Hall deals with the idea of cultures of empire in detail in her edited reader Cultures 
of empire: A reader: Colonizers in Britain and the empire in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, published in 2000. There she identifies empire to be what J. R. Seeley zoomed in 
on when he used “the name, England, the race, Englishmen, and the nation which is also an 
empire”.122 According to Uday Singh Mehta it is common cause that the Whig conception of 
history was a deliberate plan to erase a layer of British and world history in order to institute 
the idea of modernity and enlightenment.123 Mehta argues that history in relation to liberalism 
“is never merely a narrative of the past … it is also a chosen battleground” for the discourse 
on which enlightenment carries out its multi-pronged mission against religion, superstition, 
and ignorance”.124 In so doing, the thinkers and sympathizers of enlightenment sought to 
firmly establish the very idea of enlightenment as a super culture. Catherine Hall, drawing 
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from Himani Bannerji, points out that “the writing of history is not a transparent affair, nor is 
it innocent”. She says this in reference to imperial history and that of empire.125 
 
Mehta draws on Friedrich Nietzsche as he suggested plurality in the question of morality and 
the tendency of presenting non discursive notions in the work of philosophers. He suggests 
that his work focuses on British liberal thought, particularly the period of the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, where he sets to work on rewriting the meaning of the idea of the 
British empire. He contends that liberalism, British in particular, is framed along European 
lines if not national ones with the intended purpose to accommodate Europe first and 
foremost in its thinking and practice. Such a body of thought sprung from an epoch of vast 
travelling, huge commercial explorations and settling in distant lands that Macaulay leaned 
on. But in the same vein it was one that bred a sense of unfamiliarity and by contrast 
challenge the subject of familiarity in British liberal thought.126 Liberalism in Britain was the 
main vehicle for ordering the public and had dominated or occupied the cultural capital but 
when confronted with unfamiliarity resorted to labeling these unfamiliar spaces as 
“backward” by reestablishing there, in the colonies, the system of Indirect Rule that propped 
up the monarchy.127 British liberalism dispatched the unfamiliar in its own history that it had 
inherited from the English Revolution to the colonies, where it would fester and return to 
haunt the very notion of modern democracy. 
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Unfamiliarity was a constitutive element of liberal discourse. It drew on the resources of the 
unresolved question of monarchy and parliament of the English revolution and traveled to the 
colonies. A similar situation can be observed about the kingship claim of amaMpondomise, 
in that it rendered the thinkers of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries ill informed, 
even if they were particularly adept in their ways of thinking about liberalism and the spaces 
they were in. For instance, in his argument about the roles of Macaulay and James Mill as 
well as his son John Stuart Mill in developing liberal thought, Mehta says that while they 
championed the ideas of liberalism, equally they “endorsed the empire as a legitimate form of 
political and commercial governance”. They also, according to Mehta, “justify and accept its 
largely undemocratic and non-representative structure and invoke as politically relevant 
categories such as history, ethnicity, civilizational hierarchies and occasionally race and 
blood ties”.128  
 
Mehta’s criticism of English liberalism draws similarities between the problems of liberal 
thought, its historical resolutions in England and the Nhlapo commission that dismissed the 
claim to kingship of amaMpondomise and how they were compromised by unfamiliarity with 
history. For example, amaMpondomise used their internal cultural systems and institutions to 
arrive at their claim. But the Nhlapo commission notwithstanding its composition of leading 
scholars and professionals dismissed their claim on the basis of a dissimilar arrangement of 
constructing kingship. When contrasting this to how the Nhlapo Commission dismissed the 
kingship claim, the Commission was found wanting for neglecting the amaMpondomise 
cultural and political discourse on kingship. As a result, a further claim in the Umthatha high 
court following the ruling of the Nhlapo Commission resulted in the findings of the 
commission set aside. 
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The post-apartheid, post-colonial, democratic South African state embraces a thought of 
progress and universal suffrage that is in line with what liberalism associated with political 
power, “that capacious imperative for the betterment of life”.129 Mehta argues that the 
conceptualization of India in liberal doctrine and the history of empire by leading thinkers 
was articulated as one that “requires an identification of those whose past and present did not 
align themselves with the expectations of that view of progress”. This would mean “those 
who were deemed to be backward” had to be subjected to liberalism while having no 
recourse to resolving its inner contradictions.130 The state had the responsibility of using its 
machinery to bring their lives into the order of things in society, not unlike the rule of 
colonial power. This meant that it is incumbent on the state to identify and act on the “need 
and justification of a power to bring about such a progressive alignment” in the life of 
whatever residual element of backwardness remains.131 As such if there be any tension in the 
very thought of liberalism between the political and betterment of life or progress, most often 
than not “the arguments for betterment of life or progress have always held a strong if not 
trumping suit”.132 Likewise in South Africa the constitutional arrangement has always been 
tilted to the winning side of any debate if ‘unfamiliar’ ideas, institutions or practices are 
placed alongside the common perceptions that derive from public life. This suggests that the 
South African transition was deeply embedded is in the belly of liberal thought, and is not 
accommodating of any deviation from the familiar frames of liberal thought and cultures of 
empire. 
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Scholars agree that the idea of empire need further study, questioning and problematizing if a 
different way of thinking the post colony is feasible. Critical thinkers like Frantz Fanon, 
Raymond Williams, and Michel Foucault help us think the question through and afford us the 
ability to position the works of the Whig and Enlightenment thinkers in a category of thinkers 
with specific intended outcomes. They also allow for sufficient problematization of received 
wisdom. The questions that history resolved for the English revolution, the way the story of 
empire allowed it to export its sense of the unfamiliar and unresolved questions, and the way 
these have been now subject to a particular liberal discourse in the post colony may now be 
opened up to new readings and problematisation in the wake of the critique of teleological 
history. 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
State interventions in traditional leadership disputes through the Nhlapo commission  
This chapter attends to the idea that the Nhlapo commission was an attempt to address a 
larger problem of the relationship between the democratic state and traditional leadership 
which was not dealt with during the negotiation process that resulted in a transition to 
democracy. With the formation of the post-apartheid state, the Nhlapo commission was 
mandated to deal with all the issues of traditional leadership that were outstanding during the 
negotiations. One case that brought the work of the commission into sharp focus in relation to 
this question of unresolved issues is that of amaMpondomise, who claimed kingship and 
made representations to the Nhlapo commission. To understand the amaMpondomise claim 
and the Nhlapo commission debate, one needs to understand the backdrop of the negotiations 
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process. The claim to autonomy and self-determination of kingship in the democratic South 
Africa was put into question in that the commission had to investigate and determine the 
veracity, authenticity and truthfulness of the claim to kingship. In the final analysis, after 
making considerable efforts and testing the validity of the claim, the commission had the last 
word, which was to reject the kingship claim of amaMpondomise.   
 
South Africa and its democratic order was juxtaposed with apartheid policy and practices in 
that its ascendance was one that was mingled with notions of people’s power or, as advocated 
by the ruling ANC, “a government of the people by the people for the people”. This 
phenomenon was also seen to be dissimilar in that the democratic government took over from 
the apartheid regime and not directly from a colonial power. This was a marked difference 
from how the independent African states had been constituted and known. However, 
Mahmood Mamdani reminds us that there are more similarities between the independent 
African states and South African state in the so-called democratic order. In Citizen and 
Subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism (1996), Mamdani follows an 
idea that the African state at a basic level was one of separation between citizens of the 
empire and subjects of the traditional community. He interrogated the idea of apartheid as a 
system of government that continued to fracture the ranks of the ruled and disguise racial 
domination by using strategies of indirect rule, which bore similarities with independent 
African states after their independence from colonial rule:  
 
Usually understood as institutionalized racial domination, apartheid was actually an attempt 
to soften racial antagonism by mediating and thereby refracting the impact of racial 
domination through a range of Native Authorities…as a form of rule, apartheid - like the 
indirect rule colonial state – fractured the ranks of the ruled along a double divide: ethnic on 
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the one hand, rural-urban on the other…the same exceptionalism masks the colonial nature of 
the South African experience.133 
 
 Here Mamdani observes that the move from a colonial state to an apartheid state in South 
Africa was marked by structural continuity in as far as the as the ruled were concerned. He 
highlights the issue of a “double divide” which was ethnic on the one side and “rural-urban” 
on the other as a marker of that structural continuity. In Citizen and Subject, Mamdani argues 
that there were inherent similarities between independent African states in post-colonial 
stages and a post-colonial apartheid South Africa in that Native Authorities were used as a 
smoke screen of ultimate authority. The white minority held power and that in itself had 
implications for indirect rule, suggesting that apartheid South Africa maintained a bifurcated 
state from the colonial order through the maintenance of ‘native authorities’.134  
 
As an extension to Mamdani’s argument another scholar of empire, Catherine Hall, however, 
suggests that when it comes to studying the colonial order and its aftermath, scholars should 
seriously think about the implications of imperial history in postcolonial times and rethink the 
connection of race, nation and empire. She asks that scholars carefully interrogate the notion 
of  ‘empire’ along the lines of “the obvious fact of the extension of the English name into 
other countries of the globe, the foundation of greater Britain”, as Seeley once indicated in 
late nineteenth century.135 The same idea was that of colonies seen as “offshoots of the 
mother country” that facilitated the making of “Greater Britain”. These suggested the 
incorporation of colonies in the structures that made up Britain. Such incorporation suggested 
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that the “dominance of the Englishmen meant that [the encountered] racial groups could be 
comfortably assimilated without marring the ethnological unity of the whole”.136 These 
scholars suggest that colonies were to conform to the grand idea of “England” and 
Englishness as cornerstones for building any form of recognizable nationhood and statehood. 
 
Mamdani’s argument that South Africa was a double divide of the ruled populations was 
focused on emphasizing the division in the type of ruling and set of regulation principles, 
policies and procedures for the tribalized and for urbanized.137 He maintains that such 
division typified colonial rule because it sought to facilitate difference between the ethnic 
under customary laws in the rural and civic rule in the urban. However, Catherine Hall 
suggests that in fact the double divide was to serve a bigger idea of empire, which must not 
be left out when dealing with the cross over from colonial rule to ‘post-colonial’ rule.138 This 
is a point which Mamdani sought to address too in Citizen and Subject, where he argues that 
there were institutionalized elements that were not properly interrogated and therefore were 
left intact. Uday Singh Mehta, another scholar of empire, strongly argues for a careful study 
of empire, particularly the ideas that were generated to assemble understandings of 
experience during empire.139  Scholars of empire and those of the post colony seem to suggest 
that there was continuity of coloniality in post-coloniality, which may suggest a sense of 
residual existence even in democratic orders after the existence of the colony.   
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In this chapter I ask questions about the kind of state the new South African democratic state 
became as it was constitutionally made, especially in relation to its inheritance not only of 
apartheid, but empire. In particular, especially related to the interest of my study, how the 
democratic, post-apartheid and post-colonial state configured the question of coexistence 
with traditional authorities that were seen to be pre-colonial institutions side by side with a 
post-colonial, post-apartheid, democratic state.140 This draws the question of the two 
institutions being two sides of the same coin of governmentality, whether from a pre-colonial, 
colonial, semi colonial, apartheid and/or post-colonial dispensation.  
 
Patricia Hayes, in her study of the deployment of native authorities in South West Africa, 
argues that South Africa was a semi-colonial state that was a colonial power in South West 
Africa between 1915 and 1946.141 She suggests that while South Africa may be seen as a 
post-colonial state after 1910, in fact it was also a colonial power to its neighboring South 
West Africa from 1915 to 1946 and acted as such in so far as her study was involved. Fraser 
McNeill noted the investment made into tradition, which translates to institutions and 
practices of traditional authorities under the apartheid state. This is a feature that followed the 
semi-colony to which Hayes alludes. Fraser McNeill observes that in “the apartheid period as 
well as beyond it, a legally sanctioned politics of tradition coexisted with a bureaucratic state 
and planning”.142  Following the argument of the scholars of post-colonialism, McNeill 
suggests that the state employed tradition (I borrow from Foucauldian thought) as a 
governmental apparatus during, in Mehta’s terms, the fact or experience of apartheid, and 
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continued to do so even after apartheid ceased to exist.143 This suggests that tradition was 
deployed in the post-apartheid order in similar ways as it was during the apartheid 
experience, thereby marking uninterrupted continuity from apartheid to post-apartheid.   
 
Such implied continuity of “a legally sanctioned politics of tradition”, as noted by McNeill, 
suggests a sense of coexistence and accommodation within the democratic constitutional 
framework, which was seen as a dissimilar political state after apartheid. That “the sanctioned 
politics of tradition” coexisted alongside “a bureaucratic state and planning” in post-apartheid 
South Africa, hinted at the presence of apartheid apparatus that was maintained in the new 
post-apartheid political order. For instance, John Mowitt, a scholar of the medium of radio as 
an aspect of cultural studies, observed that such continuity may well be indicative of what he 
calls ‘residual’.144 In his treatment of radio studies, Mowitt deals with the genealogy of the 
residual by drawing from Raymond Williams in Marxism and Literature where Williams 
produced the concept of the “emergent”.145 Here Mowitt holds that in doing so Williams 
“also produced a concept profoundly relevant to the apparatus of radio and its history, 
namely, the concept of the residual” or in other words, the emergent, which Williams 
deployed for monarchism in Britain.146 Here Mowitt thinks about the notion a cultural 
apparatus like the monarchy that was considered to have had relevance in the past, which 
appeared to have been superseded by the prevailing consensus of the dominant.147 He 
advances the idea that the notion of residual is useful in thinking about the comeback of a 
cultural apparatus like the monarchy, setting in the idea of a comeback which “is from some 
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sort of prior moment”.148 I suggest that as McNeill observed that the post-apartheid state 
continued to deploy tradition as tied up in its beauracracy and planning marks tradition as 
residual in post-apartheid South Africa.  
 
Mowitt makes an interesting observation that radio studies, in articulating its aims, has 
presented the device of radio in consistently residual terms. He marked the limitation of the 
work of William in so far as the complications of arriving at the emergent. But he proposes 
that Adorno and Benjamin’s work in their use of the vestigial and the archaic may help in 
complicating the residual. Mowitt placed on record that “the vestigial underscores that aspect 
of what Williams calls the residual that is simply surpassed in the normative unfolding of a 
process, whether physical of psychical.149 
 
Mowitt argued that the residual may be seen in vestigial terms where the “normative 
unfolding of a process whether physical of psychical” can be noted in the development of 
societies in the world. The Marxist notion of negation of negation that left a trail of 
historically material remains which could be visible in the development of societies was 
marked in the vestigial. However, he complicated it further by suggesting a psychoanalytic 
notion of the Oedipal complex produced by Sigmund Freud in the developmental stages both 
physically and psychologically. However, Mowitt argues that such developments were 
surpassed, which suggests some kind of physiological and psychological erosion and void of 
visibility in the present. 
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While the embedded physical and psychological changes and developments may be eroded in 
marked changes of societies yet there was the fact of their existence in the vestigial residual. 
However, Mowitt complicates the residual by taking on the second term which he produced 
in the residual and calls it the archaic. As another side of the same coin of the residual he 
stated that “by contrast, the archaic is defined not by development but by metalepsis and 
resistance” here the boundaries of real and fiction are blared.150 He drew on Adorno and 
Benjamin’s exchanges on the archaic:  
 
Two epistolary formulations of Adorno capture this with concision. In one, Adorno conjoins 
the archaic and the modern by saying, ‘The archaic itself is a function of the new; it is thus 
first produced historically’ (“To Walter Benjamin”38) in and by the modern. It is the temporal 
inversion of the old and the new that I associate with metalepsis, and it implies that the 
residual registers what the dominant has produced as something like its enabling past.151  
 
Here Ardono emphasized the production of an overlap between the new and the old in which 
the archaic became “a function of the new” thereby producing metalepsis as a cultural space 
of hybrid.152 He goes on to express the meaning of metalepsis as it related the British 
monarchy: 
 
In other words, if the monarchy still matters in Britain this may have more to do with the 
contemporary political value of crafting a nationally inflected form of Tradition, or for that 
matter the dramatic chops of Dame Helen Mirren, than with an abiding popular investment in 
divine right of kings.153  
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In this regard Mowitt places the production of the residual in the emergent through the idea of 
the archaic which he holds as not developmental as is the case with the vestigial. By contrast 
to the vestigial which may not be visible in the present, the archaic according to Mowitt as he 
draws from Adorno, is visible in the present and is produced by the new.154 Adorno held that 
the archaic was the “function of the new” because it existed in relation to the interests of the 
contemporary political value.155 Mowitt goes on to argue that archaic is further specified 
through its resistant aspect in the residual which manifests itself when the site of everything 
whose voice has fallen silent because of history. In this way Adorno suggested that the 
modern produced the archaic in order to resist those demands voiced against it both in the 
present and in the present’s past.156  
 
Here the problematized endurance of residual in both vestigial and archaic terms came to 
suggest a consensus that William suggested in his production of the emergent. For instance, 
Mowitt drawing from Adorno argued that the resistance of the archaic (the monarch in 
Britain in this case) had more to do with a consensus of the current political presence with its 
claimed sense of an inflected nationality. Adorno suggested that the archaic was produced by 
the new political value and in that way implied a sense of the Foucauldian notion of 
governmentality, wherein the archaic may be an extension of the new, making it “the 
temporal inversion of the old and the new... and it implies that the residual registers what the 
dominant has produced as something like its enabling past”.157 The residual in archaic has 
notions of governmentality and the deployment of power relations between the old and the 
new so to speak. 
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In some ways the debate of the old and the new reproducing each other is an idea that Leslie 
Banks and Roger Southall drifted towards in ‘Traditional leaders in South Africa’s new 
democracy’, albeit partially, when they argue that “rather than traditional authority 
contradicting democracy, it can provide the bedrock upon which to construct new and 
experimental governments including constitutional democracies.”158 Theirs did not call for 
problematizing the politics of power between the new and the old but rather an 
instrumentality of traditional leadership in the biopolitics of the democratic South Africa. 
However, McNeill, while acknowledging the coexistence, however, noted that it was an 
“unsavoury” one, particularly in the past. This pastness related to “experience” about or of 
the past, where experience was closely associated with the “centrality of colonial relations to 
patterns of global politics and power” which produced difference in more ways than one 
during empire.159 Scholars agree that post-colonial states tend to inherit colonial structures.   
 
Part of the concern for this chapter is the question of the coexistence of a pre-colonial 
institution side by side a post-colonial and post-apartheid institution; a political constitutional 
democracy, as two sides of the same coin of rule over citizens with little intentions of 
transcending the divide.160  Here the question of the republic as a form of state power that 
fosters citizenship, sharing the same platform and enjoying institutional protection under a 
constitution with a pre-colonial institution of traditional leaders that is seen to be emphasizing 
subject-hood is at the center of examination. The chapter examines the sections that provide 
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for traditional leadership in the South African constitution of 1996 and its draft of 1993, and 
furthermore examines the roles of at least three different contributors to the processes of 
developing the constitution, namely Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Oliver Tambo.  The 
work of Mandela and Mbeki was visited through their biographies and that of Oliver Tambo 
through the archive of Albie Sachs (who was a member of the special constitution committee 
for the African National Congress since January 1988), and historical papers and tapes in the 
UWC-RIM Mayibuye archives. This chapter interrogates the question of a negotiated 
settlement as mainly political, followed by focus on the rights of traditional leadership which 
also became another source of violence in the early 1990s.161 
 
Working traditional leadership into a constitutional proposal of the African National 
Congress in exile: the special constitution committee 
 
Lungisile Ntsebeza in his article ‘Democratic decentralization and traditional authority: 
Dilemmas of land administration in South Africa’ advanced an argument that the “post –
apartheid South Africa embarked on an important democratization process that included 
reforms in local government and land administration in former Bantustans.”162 In his article 
Ntsebeza brought to sharp focus the tensions of land administration as epitomized by 
custodianship of land between elected representatives and the non-elected traditional leaders. 
On the contrary, Leslie Banks and Roger Southall suggested that traditional authority may 
well be seen as coordinates with constitutional democracies.163  Ntsebeza on the other hand is 
suspicious of the role of traditional leaders as he holds that they were not accountable and did 
not afford citizens their democratic right to elect a representative of their choice. This tension 
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as suggested by the scholars of traditional leadership and democracy in South Africa awakens 
a debate that erupted in the special constitution committee of the exiled ANC in Lusaka in the 
mid to late 1980s. 
 
 To satisfy the demands of the question of the coexistence of two seemingly juxtaposed 
institutions whose purposes and functions may be seen as emergent and residual in Mowitt’s 
terms call for a close look into the constitutional proposals before 1994.164 In this regard the 
establishment, constitution and workings of the special committee of the ANC in exile 
becomes relevant to follow the debate that ensued when it crafted its constitutional proposal. 
In this way we may be afforded a view in the thinking of the liberation movement at the time. 
Another area of interest would be the constitutional proposal of chief Mangosuthu Gatsha 
Buthelezi from the early 1980s, then paramount chief of KwaZulu Bantustan, which was 
grounded on a constitutional monarchy.165 Again of interest to me would be the reaction of 
the apartheid government and the ANC alike to Buthelezi’s proposal of a constitutional 
monarchy. These proposals gave a view of what a post-apartheid new South Africa had to 
inherit from the old order of apartheid and the liberation struggle in South Africa. 
 
For his part Oliver Tambo, then president of the ANC, exiled for more than twenty-five years 
at the time, initiated discussions within the ANC about a constitutional resolution to the 
South African problem of apartheid. He assembled a few individuals considered “think 
tanks” within the ANC in Lusaka to formulate a special Constitution committee on 8 January 
1986.166 The Albie Sachs audiovisual and historical paper archive described the establishment 
of the special constitution committee of the ANC. The minutes indicated that the first 
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meeting comprised; Oliver Tambo, Alfred Nzo, Zola Skweyiya, Penuel Maduna, Kader 
Asmal, and Jack Simons. After Nzo, who was the ANC secretary general at the time, made 
opening remarks, Tambo then inaugurated the special constitution committee and further 
outlined the committee’s aims and objectives.167  
 
The workings of the constitution committee, its proposals and positions; like the 
democratization of the institution of traditional leaders by subduing it to democratic rule and 
an antagonistic attitude to the institution, would have lasting effects even long after its 
dissolution. This was particularly the case when Jacob Zuma addressed traditional leaders in 
2009 on the issue of collaboration between the ANC and the Congress of Traditional Leaders 
of South Africa (CONTRALESA): 
 
There is a difficult but very important point that I would like to emphasise and place on the 
table today. In all parts of the world, wherever there was a serious clash between traditional 
leaders and republicans, traditional leaders have never survived. History shows that they are 
usually crushed by the republicans. It is only where amakhosi were flexible in outlook, 
strategy and tactics that they survived as an institution. There are many examples in Europe 
for example Norway, Netherlands, England and others. It is therefore critical for the 
institution to be dynamic and be able to adjust to the changing conditions. It is therefore 
important for CONTRALESA to work with the ANC to map out a strategy to properly locate 
traditional leaders in a democratic South Africa.168 
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What Jacob Zuma, the president of South Africa, said in his address resembled Whig history 
and warned traditional leaders of its implications for the institution of traditional leadership. 
As much as he was positioning his ANC as a political organization that was sympathetic to 
the institution of traditional leaders, Zuma was implicitly revoking and calling to memory the 
protracted battles between monarchy and parliament in Britain and its European counterparts 
as lessons for the new South Africa. “In all parts of the world, wherever there was a serious 
clash between traditional leaders and republicans, traditional leaders have never survived. 
History shows that they are usually crushed by the republicans”.169 Zuma retorted and 
demonstrated the strength of parliament in how it dealt with traditional leaders. He did not 
mention that this was an old tension that the ANC as a revolutionary movement was able to 
bypass or even overcome. But by putting it on record Zuma, wittingly or unwittingly, 
demonstrated the failure of the ANC in overcoming or resolving the old tension between 
forces of liberalism that emphasized progress and the residual archaic that survived as a result 
of being refashioned by the new. In this way Zuma in a post-apartheid democratic order 
confirmed the aspirations of Adorno that the archaic was produced by the new political 
value.170   
 
The constitution committee of the exiled ANC had to focus on developing constitutional 
proposals for a future South Africa which had to incorporate traditional leaders and present 
them to the NEC of the ANC for consideration. The seriousness of the constitutional 
proposals were found in what Tambo stated when he elucidated that “racist” South Africa, 
the United States of America and the United Kingdom joined hands to identify constitutional 
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options for a future South Africa.171 The “accumulated privilege” and preservation of market 
influences that sought to retain the oppressed in the stage of “tutelage” was suspected to be 
the envisaged future by the three parties.  However, Tambo was alive to the “requests by the 
friends of the liberation struggle and the demands of its enemies” such as the mentioned trio 
that had the agenda of putting impediments on the path to a revolutionary progressive South 
Africa as envisaged in the “Freedom Charter”.172 Another complication was that Albie Sachs 
observed that while the “Freedom Charter” attempted to deracialize and equalize South 
Africans it also lacked constitutionality and therefore could not be refashioned into a 
constitutional proposal for a future South Africa.173 It was against that background that 
further research even beyond the charter needed to be done to arrive at satisfactory 
revolutionary proposals.  
 
For Tambo, the “Freedom Charter” had a major role to play in the transformation of “racist” 
and super exploitative South Africa. He saw the Freedom Charter as central because of its 
formulation and its attempts to collapse the entrenched hierarchies and accumulated 
privileges. Tambo emphasized that the “trio”; namely, South Africa, United States of 
America and the United Kingdom, would not hesitate to seek constitutional solutions that 
would entrench the former positions of the oppressor and avoid the influence of the “Freedom 
Charter” for a future South Africa.174  However, these attempts by the racist regime and its 
allies would not find the ANC unprepared. Instead “the group [was meant to] look at different 
proposals” and even transcend the demands that were made in the “Freedom Charter”.175  The 
group (constitutional committee) was then charged with the responsibility to assist the ANC 
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National Executive Committee (NEC) to address “some of the major Constitutional 
problems” which did not preclude the institution of traditional leaders it (NEC) needed to 
resolve in the process of engaging the trio.176 
 
According to the Albie Sachs historical archive, the constitution committee after its 
establishment concerned itself with affording the majority of the South African population 
with universal suffrage. Thinking with Catherine Hall I ask if this was not the extension of 
empire but projected as a revolutionary development? Catherine Hall, when thinking about 
re-thinking the empire, states that: 
 
The history of the extension of suffrage in Britain, for example, has conventionally been told 
as the progressive inclusion of those once excluded, middle class men, working class men and 
eventually women. An examination of the different moments in that history reveals the ways 
in which the Empire served as a lens through which the specificities of the British nation with 
its unique constitution could be viewed, how the Empire shaped British imagination.177 
  
Hall brought the notion of Empire used as the lens in understanding the progressive moments 
as Britain extended suffrage to the different categories. Consistent with the notion of 
liberalism embedded in Empire, the linguistic employment of progress and the implied idea 
of improving life resonate with the residual in Mowitt’s terms. By some extension I want to 
ask if the workings of the ANC constitution committee were not in any way connected to 
such a residual of Empire? While the Albie Sachs archival material emphasize a 
revolutionary move in affording universal suffrage as somewhat different and very 
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progressive, I am persuaded to think that it was a recast of British empire thought. The frames 
of thought during empire seem to be very similar if not the same as that of the ANC 
constitution committee. 
      
The task of developing a constitutional proposal may have required serious consideration on 
the part of Tambo. According to the Sachs historical papers archive, on 9 January 1986, Jack 
Simons chaired the constitution committee meeting and made a plea based on the diversity of 
South African rule indicating that South Africa was made up of diverse people and cultural 
backgrounds.178 He suggested that “tribal and national groups” should be accommodated in 
the constitutional proposals. He presented this to give room to all citizens “side by side” 
under the banner of equality and the recognition that South Africa was a “plural society”.179  
However, Albie Sachs remarked that constitution committee members vehemently opposed 
this notion as it appeared to retain the idea of group rights that was advocated by apartheid 
South Africa.180  The usage of the term “culture”, “group” or “groups” and the diversity of 
the population sounded too close to the ideas that entertained “apartheid talk” which 
emphasized the segregation of different racial groupings. According Sachs such talk in the 
eyes of the constitution committee members encouraged the idea of separate development, 
which the apartheid state pushed all along. Instead the group (constitution committee) pressed 
for the collapse of apartheid institutions and structures by introducing in the constitutional 
proposal the notion of equality of citizens in the eyes of the Constitution.181 
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It is my contention that if the constitution committee had carefully considered the plea from 
Simons they may have arrived at different conclusions. In her book Traditional Leadership 
and Democratization in Southern Africa: A comparative study of Botswana, Namibia and 
South Africa, the Political Scientist, Sandra Dusing later observed that in Southern African 
states like Namibia, Botswana and South Africa traditional authority had a pivotal role to 
play in the political economy post-colonialism and apartheid. She stated that: 
 
It has been identified that the consolidation of democratic rule regime not only requires the 
constitutional establishment of representative democratic rules and the legal legitimization of 
institutions and political actors but also the careful recognition of specific culturally and 
ethnically bound, pre-constitutional political authorities.182 
 
This observation by Dusing took into account key political role players in the post-colonial 
and post-apartheid constitutional and democratic politics of the three countries. Of particular 
interest was her insight into the influences of both the constitutional democratic order and the 
careful recognition of the role of traditional schemes of authority that were at play in 
consolidating the constitutional politics of the three states. However, as it were the 
constitution committee was preoccupied with a different idea of state power which related to 
radical overthrowing existing political regimes with no space for traditional schemes of 
legitimization and politics. While such can be viewed as radically progressive forms of power 
they were still in the category of constitutionalism expressed in Marxist form.  
  
Sachs went on to argue that in the meeting of 9 January 1986 the constitution committee 
argued strongly for the equality of citizens before the Constitution with the intention to 
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advance ideas of people’s power.183 “People’s power” was understood to be a revolutionary 
takeover of power by popular communist parties like it was in Mozambique and Angola at 
the time.184 Sachs remarked that Tambo deeply admired Mozambique for instance, for the 
way it tackled the question of traditionalism185 in that it afforded all its citizens equality in the 
constitution of the country and in that way eliminated the embedded hierarchies in the social 
order. However, Tambo’s commitment to the “Freedom Charter” constituted a problem for 
him because the charter entertained a “multiparty system” which recognized a plural society 
and did not necessarily conform to the notion of a people’s power where the communist party 
seized all power.  
 
The historical papers and tapes positioned the “Freedom Charter” as one that afforded space 
for multiplicity in cultural identities and nationalities as a result of its articulated multi-party 
system.186 Sachs suggested that the tension that was presented by the charter and the people’s 
power notions led the committee to engage in meaningful discussion of what was to be done. 
It was against that background that the constitution committee agreed to conduct a 
comparative study of constitutions from different parts of the world.187 To look at how these 
constitutions dealt with the tension of people’s power and a liberal constitutional framework 
and addressing the issue of cultural diversity, which constituted a dilemma for the treatment 
of traditional authority. But what became more important for the constitution committee was 
giving universal suffrage to the African majority that was economically exploited by whites 
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and was the subject of tribal authorities. This suggested the idea of constitutionalization of 
traditional authority which called for a shift to traditionalization of traditional authority. The 
Whig tension captured the making of the new South African democracy at this level in that 
the anti-monarch sentiment expounded its voice. According to Mowitt the emerging 
dominant force was soon to articulate its position and was about to make “the archaic itself ... 
a function of the new ... and it implie[d] that the residual register[ed] what the dominant has 
produced”.188 The constitution committee inevitably entered a space of domesticating 
traditional authority to the demands of the new order even as it was in the making. However, 
they were blinded by their anger against traditional authorities that were custodians of 
Bantustans who were seen to be an extension of the white Afrikaner state. 
 
In his treatment of traditional authorities under white minority rule Mahmood Mamdani 
argued that the Bantustans were a means to soften racial differences and that they were an 
extension of indirect rule of the colonial period. In Citizen and Subject he was dealing with 
the nonracial institutional legacy of colonialism which remains largely intact, he argues that 
apartheid was:189 
 
Scholars of empire, post-colonial and cultural studies agree with Mamdani that the post-
colony was shaped by its inheritance from the preceding epoch.190 While the debates of the 
constitution committee sought to avoid affording ethnicity, tribalism and racism in the future 
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constitution of South Africa by consulting Constitutions from capitalist to socialist 
countries.191 With its discussions categorically stated that “Tribally based parties will be 
prohibited” in the new constitutional order to avoid the pitfalls of racial discrimination.192 
However, the committee failed to go beyond Whig historical tendencies and empire in that it 
maintained the double divide.  
 
Ntsebeza argued that the democratic South Africa was exposed to risk and serious 
compromise because of concessions made to traditional authorities who enjoyed enormous 
powers under apartheid.193 However, according to Sachs the constitution committee strongly 
argued against the inclusion of tribal talk in the constitutional proposals; such was indicative 
of the ANC’s anger at the role played by some of the tribal authorizes in charge of the 
Bantustan system back home. As a result the prohibition of tribalism by the group sought to 
address the duality of the situation which the ANC fought against: apartheid and its Bantustan 
system.194  
 
The publicly known traditional leaders and traditional authorities were closely linked to 
Bantustan leaders. This link of Bantustan leadership with traditional leadership was seen by 
the ANC as collaboration with the apartheid state and as a result attracted criticism. But the 
ANC, being a revolutionary movement that had radical public pronouncements, was 
dominated by the language of people’s power, which was associated with a complete 
overthrow of the apartheid state and related institutions as well as the communist rule that 
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encouraged the rule of the proletariat interests, in the 1980s which suggested that it was not 
accommodative to the idea of an institution of traditional leadership especially that this 
institution was viewed as hereditary and not democratic, especially that it considered it to be 
encouraging of ethnic divisions under the leadership of traditional leaders. However, on 1 to 
4 March 1988 the “In-House Seminar on Constitutional Matters and Related Issues” held in 
Lusaka led the way to the tolerance of the traditional leadership institution among those that 
participated in the seminar.195 In the seminar Penuel Maduna tabled a paper on ‘Non-Central 
Government Structures in South Africa today’ where he discussed peripheral government 
structures which included the institution of traditional leadership. Maduna argued for the 
incorporation of the institution of traditional leadership in the constitutional proposal of a 
new South Africa; a position that was later followed by Banks and Southall in 1996:196 
 
The [ANC in house seminar of March 1988] will have to discuss the place and role of the 
institution of traditional rulers, taking into account the recent emergence of the Congress of 
Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) for instance. In some jurisdictions 
such as Guinea, Benin, the Congo and Tanzania, traditional institutions used by the colonialist 
for artificially preserving and sustaining disunity among the colonized have been fully 
liquidated. Yet, in others such as Zambia and Zimbabwe, the institution of traditional rulers 
even has a place in their constitutions. The British themselves have preserved an archaic 
institution, namely the House of Lords.197 
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According to Albie Sachs the argument by Penuell Maduna at the “in house seminar” marked 
the distance travelled by the ANC think tanks on the issue of traditional leadership.198 It was 
indicative of the change of heart from rejection to a more accommodative tone. The examples 
of the “Guinea, Benin, the Congo and Tanzania” were contextualized under the position of 
the role they played in colonial times. While “Zambia, Zimbabwe and Britain” were used to 
offset the notion of complete “liquidation” as discussed in the chapter that dealt with Whig 
history and how empire played a central role in the retention of the monarch in Britain. Also 
the contribution of Mowitt in discussing the residual holds. Maduna’s argument was that 
instead of holistically rejecting the institution of traditional leadership and therefore 
precluding it in the constitutional proposal, it was better to include it and carefully consider 
the examples of Zambia and Zimbabwe in Southern Africa and Britain in Europe.199 
 
Adam Ashforth entered that debate by complicating the previously held notion of the 
constitution committee about the untransformed nature of traditional authorities. He held the 
view that not all traditional leaders collaborated with the apartheid state.  
 
Albie Sachs notes that the institution of chieftainship has not been democratic because chiefs 
inherit their positions. But many chiefs have assisted in the struggle to achieve democracy in 
South Africa. The objective of the ANC proposals is “not so much to democratize traditional 
institutions as to constitutionalize them’.200   
 
                                                          
198 Albie Sachs Tape 2 on the constitution, RIM UWC Mayibuye Archives, (Cape Town: University of the 
Western Cape, 2009) 
199 Penuell M. Maduna, ‘Non-central government structures in South Africa today’, In house Seminar on 
Constitutional Matters and Related Issues, (Lusaka: African National Congress, March 1988), p 12. 
200 Adam Ashforth, ‘Communitarianism Vs. Individualism: Constitutionalism in Namibia and South Africa’, in 
Wisconsin International Law Journal, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Law School, 1994) 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 81 
 
Ashforth observed that Sachs was a proponent of constitutional law, to which I add that he 
was also a former member of the ANC constitution committee in exile and member of the 
Communist Party both of which supported the idea of people’s power. According to Ashforth 
Sachs seemed to be stuck in the old argument of rendering the institution of traditional 
leadership as a counter revolutionary institution and therefore anti progressive. This is a view 
that is shared by Ntsebeza when thinking about the role of traditional leadership in a 
democratic order.201 Interestingly, Ashforth differs with both of them and problematizes their 
argument by stating that in fact traditional leadership was not homogeneous under apartheid. 
Because, as Ashforth argues “many chiefs have assisted in the struggle to achieve democracy 
in South Africa” and may not be ruled out as entirely counter-revolutionary. In citing the 
example of heredity as the problem of traditional leadership Sachs was able to hold a 
persuasive argument in favor of legitimating state interventions in the institution of traditional 
leadership. However, Ashforth argued that in as much as Sachs argued against the 
undemocratic nature of traditional leadership, in fact the underlying intention was to 
constitutionalize the institution.  
  
For Sandra Dusing democratic states in the quest for democratizing the institution of 
traditional leadership managed to formalize relations through constitutional means but 
neglected certain aspects in the aftermath. She added her voice to the debate by concluding 
that: 
 
Although traditional leaders lost much of their legitimacy in forming part of the colonial and 
apartheid dispensation, they managed to maintain traditional systems of accountability and 
consultation in rural local government. Whilst in some cases traditional leaders lost the 
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support of their communities, there are still many in which they continue to play an important 
role, and enjoy recognition as representatives of traditional government. Democratic-
representative principles and institutions have been formerly, i.e. constitutionally, installed 
and manifested, but further observation of quality, content and long term outcomes of 
political processes are largely neglected. It has been identified that the consolidation of 
democratic rule regime not only requires the constitutional establishment of representative 
democratic rules and the legal legitimization of institutions and political actors but also the 
careful recognition of specific culturally and ethnically bound, pre-constitutional political 
authorities. These traditional institutions of political authority and widely accepted rules of 
political legitimacy, were established centuries before the new democratic regime. The 
development of realistic prospects and strategies for democratization in Southern African 
countries must recognize that the legitimacy of many influential political actors is often 
simultaneously rooted in two parallel systems of authority, namely constitutionally defined 
democratic- representative principles and customary rules of specific ethnically based, 
African institutions.202           
 
Dusing argued along the lines of established legitimization of traditional authority as a 
bedrock of a transition to a democratic order in Southern African. In what Mowitt called the 
residual, she unearthed the vestigial aspect of the institution and also highlighted the duration 
of survival which lasted centuries before the advent of a democratic dispensation in Southern 
Africa. Secondly she suggested that accountability and consultation in rural communities 
were integral parts of the legitimating schemer for traditional authorities. Consequently, she 
suggested that accountability and consultation were traditional institutions of political authority, 
over and above that, they were widely accepted rules of political legitimacy. Finally, she noted the 
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duration of their existence by stating that they were established centuries before the new democratic 
regimes in Southern Africa.203 
 
Were there entanglements in the constitutional development of South 
Africa in relation to the institution of traditional leadership?  
 
The 1993 draft constitution has a fully-fledged chapter on the recognition of traditional 
leadership. Chapter 11 of the draft constitution recognized the existence of traditional 
authorities: 
 
A traditional authority which observes a system of indigenous law and is recognized by law 
immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, shall continue as such an 
authority and continue to exercise and perform the powers and functions vested in it in 
accordance with the applicable laws and customs, subject to any amendment or repeal of such 
laws and customs by a competent authority. 
 
When looking at chapter eleven of the draft Constitution of 1993 which provided for 
traditional authorities it, to some extent, has a potential of reinforcing notions of tribalism and 
ethnicity in a post-colonial, post-apartheid state. It reflects a convolution of and a residue of 
colonial and apartheid institutionalization in the new South African constitution. This 
presence of the residue of this institution can be partially associated with a choreographed 
violence that was orchestrated by what Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki and O’Malley and the 
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Weekly Mail of July 1991 called the workings and influences of “third force” and chief 
Buthelezi.204 
 
On the contrary Eddy Maloka in 1995 wrote on the African Communist that traditional 
leaders worked in unison. He said:  
 
In the last few years the chiefs, through Contralesa, the IFP and Goodwill Zwelithini, 
were able to win a privileged position for themselves during the negotiations. The 
Interim Constitution has made provision for the creation of a House of Traditional 
Leaders in the provinces and a Council of Chiefs at the national level.205  
 
Maloka argued that the organization of traditional leaders CONTRALESA, IFP and Goodwill 
Zwelithini were privileged during the political transition negotiations at Kempton Park.206 
That they were accorded chapter eleven in the interim constitution was a privilege they 
perhaps did not deserve according to Maloka. But such articulation did not translate to an 
unproblematic relationship between the state and the institution of traditional leaders. 
 
Did the constitutional development liberate, democratize or constitutionalize the institution of 
traditional leadership; what understandings and processes were involved in this regard? 
Could the institution of traditional leadership in South Africa respond to the demands of 
constitutionalism? Adam Ashforth pointed to the deception that was advanced by Albie Sachs 
which held the view that traditional leaders, by virtue of their inherited positions of authority, 
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needed to be democratized through constitutional arrangements. On the contrary Ashforth 
noted that rather than democratizing the institution of traditional leadership Sachs was 
involved in a process of constitutionalizing it.207 Scholars differ on the issue of 
democratization of the institution of traditional leaders, and there exists a phenomenon that 
suggests a chaotic arrangement of how the state handled the matter. Jude Fokwang, drawing 
from a number of scholars, suggests that what the state talked about in democratizing the 
institution of traditional leadership left some questions unanswered. He stated the following: 
 
For example, Maloka’s (1995) call for an agenda that aims to erode the legitimacy of chiefs 
and to replace them with democratic structures fails to ask or reflect on the following: i) how 
‘democratic’ are the new supposedly democratic structures on the ground?  ii) What is the 
relationship between chiefs and these democratic structures?  iii) Have so-called democratic 
structures actually managed or controlled access to strategic resources such as land to the 
satisfaction of the target population?208    
 
Fokwang asked these questions to probe the idea of aligning the institution of traditional 
leadership with the constitution in the hope of democratizing them. His argument punches 
holes in the grand scheme that was presented by the ruling party and the trusted jurist Albie 
Sachs. These practical questions assist us in quickening a critical citizenry. 
 
He went on to outline the arguments of different scholars on the matter and showed that 
scholars were divided on the question as well: 
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Much of the current literature provides evidence for the compatibility of chiefs and 
democracy (Becker 2006; Friedman 2005; Goncalves 2005; Lindstrom and White 1997; 
Oomen 2005). Evidence for this is based on research and discussion on policy frameworks 
affecting chiefs in rural local government and their involvement in regional and or national 
politics. Ntsebeza (1998; 2005) for instance has examined the predicament of chiefs in the 
new South Africa following legislation that has affected the institution since the early 1990s. 
He points out that the South African Constitution and the Local Government Transition Act 
of 1993 (as amended), ‘do not anticipate any meaningful role for traditional authorities in 
local government.’209  
 
In the passage Fokwang undertook to outline arguments about compatibility of the institution 
of traditional leadership and a democratic state. Ntsebeza for instance argues that the 
legislation that involves traditional authorities reduced their roles in local government. He 
says legislation did not anticipate any meaningful role for the institution of traditional 
leadership. In other words, while the state recognized the institution it also through its pieces 
of legislation undermined and eroded it role. 
 
Drawing from Ntsebeza, Fokwang continues to illustrate the dived within the state about the 
role and place of traditional authorities:  
 
According to him, there is an obvious difference in opinion between the older generation and 
the younger generation with regard to the question of constitutional guarantees for traditional 
leadership. While the older generation, for instance represented by Nelson Mandela, supports 
the view that chieftaincy should gain more constitutional accommodation, the younger camp, 
represented by the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), youths and the 
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South African Communist Party (SACP) maintains that chieftaincy should be restricted to 
custom and tradition, or better still, eradicated completely.210  
 
Here Fokwang demonstrated a tension existing in the system of the state where part of the 
constituency like the older generation represented by Mandela advocated for the retention and 
constitutional accommodation of the chieftaincy while the other like the South African 
Communist Party (SACP), youth and South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) 
sought to eradicate it. Indicative of a reverberating debate of the Whigs and the Tory in 
Britain during empire which was carried through in the debates of the special constitution 
committee of the exiled ANC. Ntsebeza for instance was opposed to the coexistence of 
traditional leadership and a constitutional democracy.211 Interestingly Fokwang followed this 
thread of discourse to arrive at some of the celebrated scholars in field. He continued: 
 
Bank and Southall (1996) have interesting findings with respect to the status of chiefs in post-
apartheid South Africa. In addition to exploring the policy framework dealing with chiefs, 
they argue that traditional leadership does not necessarily contradict democracy. To them, 
traditional leadership can in fact ‘provide the bedrock upon which to construct new and 
experimental governments, including constitutional democracies.’ They also consider an 
important question ignored by Maloka (1995) and Mamdani (1996): what is the relationship 
between chiefs and new democratic structures on the ground in the countryside?212 
    
Contrary to Ntsebeza and Maloka Bank and Southall ask the question of relevance and 
relationship between the institution of traditional leaders and the new democratic structures 
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on the ground. Both Ntsebeza and Maloka based their arguments on the tension that arouse 
prior to the first local government elections after 1994. In the area of Hershel in the Eastern 
Cape traditional authorities had a tension with SANCO over roles in local government.213 
Now the two scholars use such an isolated incident to generalize about the tension that exists 
between local government and the institution of traditional leadership. Bank and Southall 
argue for collaboration and inclusion without creating hostility between the state and the 
institution. 
 
In 2007 Khosi F. P. Kutama the chairperson of the National House of traditional leaders, in 
his annual report of the 2006 to 2007 financial year, suggested that traditional leaders’ 
powers were limited in terms of the constitution: 
 
The biggest challenge lying ahead is the guaranteeing of the powers of 
amakhosi/marena/dikgosi in the constitution, which can only be remedied by constitutional 
amendment. Despite the indication by the President - that the Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Act, 2003 must firstly be implemented in full before the amendment 
of the Constitution can be considered – it remains a critical issue for traditional leadership to 
pursue. We will proceed to strive for eliminating any form of ambiguity regarding the powers 
of traditional leadership.214 
 
The chairperson of the national house of traditional leaders addressed President Mbeki on the 
deficiency of constitutional guarantees for traditional leadership. As national chairperson 
Kutama articulated the frustrations of the national house of traditional leaders about the 
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powers and roles of traditional leaders in relation to state power. Here Kutama questioned the 
truth of the relationship between the institution of traditional leaders and the constitution. 
What that relationship does not lie in what is said about it but the real contradiction that it 
produced not necessarily in the product but in its process and production of such a 
relationship. Pointing directly to the deceitful democratization that was claimed by Sachs in 
earlier years he called upon president Mbeki to consider affording traditional leaders better 
constitutional guarantees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
The Nhlapo Commission and the politics of state commissioned inquiry  
How the Nhlapo Commission came about and the debates that brought it into being will be 
examined. In this chapter I ask about the historical background of commissions of enquiry in 
relation to traditional leadership in colonial, semi colonial, apartheid South Africa experience. 
Which may have resemblance, similarity, contradiction and blending with the Nhlapo 
commission of the post-colonial, post-apartheid and democratic South Africa after 1994. It is 
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of interest to follow the understandings of state thought about commissions of inquiry where 
traditional leadership was involved. I want to ask questions about the Nhlapo commission in 
this chapter as a means of seeking to understand some of the key issues that necessitated the 
state to establish the Nhlapo commission. In following the process of establishing such a 
commission I seek to understand who the key role players were in the commission and also 
trace the politics of power/knowledge in the workings of the commission where possible. Of 
vital importance to my study, however, is how the Mhlontlo Chieftaincy came to be presented 
to the Nhlapo Commission. 
 
Who established the commission? Which instruments did they use? 
 
There is general speculation that the democratic state, out of its own volition, set up the 
Nhlapo commission to sort out, undo and properly restore the institution of traditional 
leadership in South Africa from the effects of colonialism and apartheid.215 By and large this 
assertion suggests that the democratic state had the best interests of the institution of 
traditional leaders at heart. A further suggestion was that the democratic order had good 
moral standing in comparison to its predecessors which may be construed as a legitimate 
contribution towards the moral turn against colonialism and apartheid.216 However, scholars 
suggest that in the intervening period between the death of apartheid and the beginning of the 
democratic order, the dying years of apartheid before the ANC took power, the issue of an 
audit within the institution of traditional leadership was brought to the ANC by traditional 
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leaders themselves.217 Drawing from email exchanges with professor Thandabantu Nhlapo, 
three South African scholars, namely; Twala, Kompi and Seleho show how the matter was 
brought to the attention of the African National Congress (ANC) by the Congress of 
Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRLESA) 
 
According to Twala, Kompi and Seleho it was the traditional leaders through their newly 
established party who started the process at Kempton Park during the political transition 
negotiations that approached the ANC.218 These scholars suggest that CONTRALESA as a 
political structure that represented traditional leaders in the last years of apartheid South 
Africa yielded its responsibility to the ANC. They went on to argue that CONTRALESA, in 
approaching the ANC at Kempton Park, categorically called for the naming and shaming of 
imposters in the traditional leadership landscape. A call they made both during the Kempton 
Park political transition negotiations and in the process of constitutional development for a 
new South Africa, which suggested consistency in their institutional demands, indicative of 
the central issue that threatened the institution for them. However, in my observation, by 
entrusting the future of their institution in the hands of the ANC, traditional leaders left it to 
the ANC to decide what was good for the institution going into the future, and in this way 
may have lost a golden opportunity. If according to Twala, Kompi and Seleho traditional 
leaders made the ANC their conduit and interlocutor during the political transition 
negotiations, in hindsight, they may have erred. Instead of inserting the institution in the 
impending political order themselves, in their own terms, they chose to place their internal 
grievances on the political transition negotiating table, rather than working the institution into 
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the future political order and asserting the institution’s strategic positioning. This may have 
either avoided or increased the whiggish tensions exhibited by the likes of Sachs who had to 
be forced to advocate for the inclusion of traditional authorities in the constitutional 
arrangement while undermining and destroying its role in state participation at the same time 
through legislative processes. A consistent and direct involvement, devoid of tabling internal 
squabbles from within, of CONTRALESA in the negotiations could better manage the 
tendencies that were at play in the South Africa political landscape at the point of developing 
the constitution and the regulations that followed its adoption and amendment, a part that 
chapter one dealt with.  
 
In October 2004 President Thabo Mbeki inaugurated an independent commission of enquiry 
into the disputes and claims of Traditional leaders.219The commission was established in 
terms of the Traditional Leadership framework Act 41 of 2003. Section 23 of the Act 
provides that the State President has the prerogative of establishing an independent inquiry 
into claims and counter claims and disputes by Traditional Leaders.220But the disputes and 
claims came from the institution of Traditional Leaders itself. Traditional Leaders brought up 
disputes of legitimacy and imposters as well as new claims to kingship by the Dlaminis of 
south KwaZulu Natal and amaMpondomise in the Eastern Cape for instance again, during the 
consultation processes leading up to the adoption of the Traditional Leaders Framework Act 
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of 2003 these claims and counter claims were made. The consultative processes facilitated a 
conversation among kings and princes where the state recognizes their status, roles and 
responsibilities in society alongside a constitutional state with a presidential constitution. 
While the consultative processes just before the enactment of the traditional leader’s 
framework act facilitated a consensus between the state and the institution of traditional 
leaders, they equally brought up sharp criticism and disputes that questioned each other’s 
legitimacy like pointing out the unequal treatment of kings and complaints about imposter 
kingdoms that the state continued to recognize.  
 
The question I ask about the different attempts of the state made in dealing with the question 
of traditional leaders in a post-colonial and post-apartheid state still remains. Why did a state 
that was delinked from the legacy of the past have to go to great lengths in trying to 
accommodate or even graft the existence of a supposedly pre-colonial institution in a post-
colonial and post-apartheid environment? Timothy Gibbs suggests that the ANC made 
commitments to Bantustan leaders who in themselves were traditional leaders who ruled 
those territories by virtue of their royal associations: 
 
When explaining the survival of many Bantustan bureaucrats and the reassertion of traditional 
authority in rural South Africa after 1994, many academics have suggested that the ANC 
leadership struck a compromise deal with the remnants of the old order above the heads of the 
grassroots insurgents. Jeff Peires provides an incisive account of how many Bantustan 
functionaries adeptly dropped their ties to the apartheid regime and secured their positions in 
the post-apartheid era. Lungisile Ntsebeza argues that the ‘decentralized despotism’ of the 
chieftaincy remains unbroken. Barbara Oomen and Ineke van Kessel emphasize the residual 
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power of the traditional leadership and the pluralism institutions in the rural regions where the 
writ of democratically elected, local government does not run far.221 
 
Peires in ‘the implosion of Transkei and Ciskei ’argued that the homelands produced black 
middle class who inherited privileges of white traders and civil servants. This was viewed as 
a class that continued to maintain white interests and interestingly the same ones the ANC 
made undertakings to keep in the new democratic order even before it was born. Ntsebeza in 
‘Democratic decentralization and tribal authority: Dilemmas of land administration in rural 
South Africa’ also suggests that while the new democratic dispensation facilitated a link with 
the local government layer of the state, it also introduced a problematic compatibility matter 
between elected officials and inherited positions of chiefs. For Ntsebeza the new democratic 
dispensation continued to advantage the undemocratic institution that was responsible for 
autocratic rule under apartheid and placed an important task of land redistribution in the 
hands of such an undemocratic institution. Categorically Ntsebeza decries the concessions 
being made to traditional authorities even during the democratization process. Consequently, 
Oomen and van Kessel in ‘one chief, one vote: the revival of traditional authorities in post-
apartheid’ argue that while chiefs were viewed with suspicion as puppets of the state under 
apartheid, they reinvented themselves under the democratic rule. An important turning point 
was the formation of CONTRALESA in 1988 which aligned itself with the government in 
waiting. These arguments suggest that there were continuities and guarantees given to the 
institution of traditional leadership crossing over from apartheid to the new democratic rule 
under the ANC government. 
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At face value Traditional Leadership cannot have disputes, claims, counter claims, 
accusations and counter accusations because it is viewed as a custodian of respectable 
African culture, linked to the fact that Kings and princes occupy positions with clear and 
undisputed family trees. Therefore, it might not be possible to have or even entertain such 
disputes. However, Timothy Gibbs, in his book Mandela’s Kinsmen: Nationalist Elites and 
Apartheid’s First Bantustan; suggests that royal trees can be manipulated to suit particular 
state policies and purposes. He argues that in 1963 “[a]s a reward for supporting Matanzima’s 
Government, some of  Sigcau’s supporters were raised from being headmen to sub-chiefs, 
then chiefs – a process that involved a government ethnologist pruning and grafting royal 
branches onto the king’s genealogical tree.”222 Here he is suggesting that the first Bantustan 
state manipulated the Mpondo royal family tree to privilege those who supported the state 
policy. The royal family did not resist the move as it benefited them at the time, suggesting 
that this was congruent with the aspirations of gaining more power and influence. The state 
and the institution of Traditional Leadership joined hands in a mutually beneficial political 
maneuver.   
 
From the outset the post-apartheid State as a governing institution in a post-colonial and post-
apartheid era and the institution of Traditional Leadership set up a framework of working 
together to advance state policy in the new environment. The post-apartheid State was 
understood to be representing a value system that marked a clear departure from colonial and 
apartheid links and tendencies, and sought to restore the dignity of the Traditional Leadership 
institution. Departure from the modern project was marked by reaffirming the identity of 
those seen to be “subjects” and not “citizens” under the modern order. But in his introduction 
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of Citizen and Subject Mahmood Mamdani argues that we find ourselves at the center of two 
divides namely; liberal and Africanist. He goes on to argue that “the liberal…is to locate 
politics in civil society, and the Africanist solution is to put Africa’s age old communities at 
the center of African politics” which is what the Nhlapo Commission attempts to do to some 
extent.223I draw from Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee, who also argued that the 
South African society under every epoch intensified, modified or extended patterns of social 
and economic organization that rested on early Cape Colony which was linked to the 
development of liberal in the South African society.224 Patterns of domination and subjection 
continued to mark the landscape of society supported by schemes of privileging even in the 
post-colonial order of a post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
Gibbs, drawing from Ntsebeza, notes that the institution of Traditional Leaders was inscribed 
with continued relationships of privileging that came from the colonial order crossing over to 
the post-apartheid order.225 Its relationship with the states, namely; colonial state, the 
apartheid state and the post-apartheid state constantly grappled with the idea of accumulation, 
reversing and discontinuities of privileging schemes in as far as the state’s involvement was 
concerned on the one hand.226On the other hand, to use Mowitt’s terms, the institution of 
traditional leadership appeared to be residual and archaic to be specific, which represented a 
pre-colonial value system that has long been eroded by the colonial order and apartheid but 
resisted.227  
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The post-apartheid State advocated a policy of the” return” to a more inclusive, 
accommodative, hospitable and respect anchored value system of “ubuntu”, understood to be 
affirming the interconnectedness and brotherhood of men. Just as Mbeki espoused the 
centrality of African values and norms, systems and institutions in resolving African 
problems in an attempt to reverse the legacy of slavery, colonialism and the apartheid system. 
Such oppressive systems sought to govern the psychological reactions of the ruled and to 
condition them to think of themselves as inferior beings and incapacitated to deal with the 
challenges they face. Mbeki’s attempts were aimed at unsettling the legacy of oppression by 
inserting the affirmation of African systems values and approaches. The evocation of African 
institutions sought to reclaim the position Africa once occupied where external hegemony 
could not take root in dictating how the continent was run. The return to “ubuntu”, as 
advocated by the state, is a value system that resonates with Traditional Leadership systems 
of governance. This suggested that the state advocates for a policy of pre-coloniality in what 
it claimed to be post-colonial. In this way I suggest that it landed itself in a discursive space.  
 
The post-apartheid state, considered to be progressive by ANC politicians, deployed state 
apparatus and sought to accommodate the institution of traditional leadership under a 
progressive democracy after 1994. Its use of state organs such as the office of the president, 
the office of the minister of traditional affairs, the Traditional Leadership Framework Act 41 
of 2003 to formulate a commission of enquiry to consider issues relating to the institution of 
traditional leaders suggested attempts for the registration of the archaic by the new political 
values in Mowitt’s terms. Mahmood Mamdani questioned the wholesale accommodation of 
the institution in a post-colonial state in Citizen and Subject. He suggested that the institution 
of traditional leaders must be “democratized” if it was to occupy an important position in a 
post-colonial state. Owing to the many state interventions into the institution by the colonial 
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and apartheid states through concerted interventions like laws and commissions, however, the 
institution remained with the remnants of coloniality and apartheid.228 The post-apartheid 
state equally used its apparatus to exert its power over the institution of traditional leadership 
as part of its effort to democratize it and make it serve all South African citizens.229 Against 
this background Sydney Mufamadi and Thabo Mbeki instituted the commission on traditional 
leadership dispute and claims in October 2004 as a confirmation of the archaic being 
registered by the new political value system which asked for the institution to justify its 
existence. However, in the registration of the archaic by the new, the formation of the 
commission recognized and undermined and destroyed the very institution of traditional 
leadership that may have been seen as the custodian of ubuntu. This suggests that the state 
while advocating a policy of ubuntu it is equally involved in undermining and destroying 
some of the institutions that presents and represent it. 
 
What is the historical role of commissions of inquiry in South Africa about Traditional 
Leadership? 
The Nhlapo commission follows at least two other independent commissions of enquiry that 
dealt with the question of traditional leadership under the colonial and apartheid states. In the 
late nineteenth century there was a Brownlee Commission of enquiry into Native Laws and 
Customs of 1880-1881.230 The Brownlee commission followed some of the decisive armed 
confrontations in the history of late colonial rule in South Africa like the Sandlwane 1878, 
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Ngcayechibi 1879 and the gun war also known as the (Transkeian rebellion)  of 1880.231 It 
was set up to investigate customary practices and laws of the indigenous people in the colony 
with the intention of developing the many customary laws for “natives’ as markers of the 
subdivisions of the “subjects” so as to entrench the idea of “ethnic pluralism” as Mamdani 
put it.232 “Ethnic pluralism” implied what he called “territorial segregation” that encouraged 
the racialization of the state through physical location, linked to a political system that 
segregated the ruled institutionally. The commission made a comparison between civil 
colonial laws and indigenous laws, the basis of which was to establish customary laws for the 
indigenous people on a number of issues. Drawing from Mamdani I want to argue that the 
commission on Native Laws and Customs was a means to carefully separate people through 
establishing different customary laws for different people to achieve the separation of 
ethnically motivated systems. In this way “ethnic pluralism” took root and created the 
necessary distance between civil law and native law. For Mamdani this set the ground for the 
laying of the foundations of the ‘structure and the nature of European power in South Africa’ 
which would afford the Europeans to force their will on the natives using civil laws and 
customary law.233 
 
In accordance with the “continuity and decentralization” imperatives, which were later 
articulated by Frederick Lurgard in ‘The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 1926’, the 
Brownlee commission assisted the Cape Colonial state to consolidate the ‘structure of 
European power in South Africa’. The same set the stage for the separation of civil society 
and the rural communities just by using a legal framework.234 The structure of European 
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power in South Africa’ created a platform where the urbanized people were governed by civil 
laws and the rural people were governed as subjects of customary laws.235A separation of the 
state into two distinct legal spaces as needed by the colonial power was therefore achieved as 
a result. According to Mamdani a “plural ethnic” state system was equally achieved to 
separate indigenous people using different customary laws, according to their ethnic groups, 
as a point of reference. For the most part traditional leaders were encouraged to apply these 
as markers of their authority in their respective districts.236 The Brownlee commission 
successfully usurped the powers of traditional leaders to preside over issues that were marked 
as issues of civil authority. It rubbished issues like lobola, polygamy and the prosecution of 
witches.237 While it could be seen to be an independent commission it strongly reinforced 
colonial attitude and official policy positions in how the state dealt with rural communities 
and traditional leaders in particular.  
 
Moving from the Brownlee commission the second commission I would like to examine is 
the one commissioned by the apartheid state under CB Young.238 According to Gibbs the 
apartheid state instituted an independent commission of enquiry that dealt with issues of 
traditional leadership in the 1950s. In part the apartheid state solicited the power and 
influence of traditional leaders to legitimate themselves in the eyes of the South African 
people that stay in rural areas, as Sandra Dusing suggested.239 Gibbs for his part observed that 
without attempting to change the arrangement of power relations from the colonial era, the 
apartheid state sought to establish traditional authorities in line with the Native 
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Administration act of 1927.240 Against this background the state passed the Bantu Authorities 
Act of 1951that sought to give traditional authorities more room to exercise power in their 
localities.  Gibbs continued to note that the state “established a system of Tribal Authorities: 
new tiers of segregated, local ‘tribal’ administration in which government-appointed chiefs 
took new powers.”241 In this way according to Mamdani Bantustans were established as 
means of self-government where traditional leaders were at the head and that they were 
means of ‘softening’ racism in South Africa. Gibbs argues that this system brought along 
with it a series of disputes and conflict between those traditional leaders that supported the 
apartheid state and those that opposed it. For instance, following a secession bid by Kaiser 
Matanzima, who supported the apartheid state, from King Sabata Dalindyebo’s Thembuland, 
the apartheid state established a commission of enquiry. C. B. Young led this commission to 
investigate the issues of dispute and claims between Kaizer Matanzima and King Sabata 
Dalindyebo who opposed apartheid.242 
 
During the next few years, Sabata’s councilors mustered all the firepower they could find in 
both legal and customary practice in their attempts to derail Kaiser Matanzima from 
establishing himself as an independent chief under the Bantu Authorities Act. … An official 
commission of enquiry led by the Secretary of Native Affairs, C. B. Young, came to Transkei 
to investigate the genealogy of the Thembu kingdom. The question at hand was whether the 
Matanzima branch was deserving of an autonomous chieftaincy entirely independent of the 
main Dalindyebo stem of the Thembu kingdom. The government fiddled the rules to get their 
way.243 
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As is evident in the example above, Gibbs’ treatment of the Young commission suggests state 
interference in the affairs of traditional leadership through the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, 
a piece of legislation that according to Ntsebeza gave traditional leaders more powers under 
apartheid. At this point he added his voice to the idea of a despotic arrangement of traditional 
leadership as produced by Mamdani. Gibbs studied the issues that affected the Thembu 
kingdom in the 1950s to support the notion of state interference to the affairs of traditional 
leadership through independent commissions of enquiry. The Young commission did not 
close the history of commissions on issues of traditional leadership but continued the legacy 
of state commissions. The so called independent Young commission as Gibbs observes was 
far from being neutral. In fact he argues that “[t]he government fiddled the rules to get their 
way”.244 Fiddling with the rules suggested that the Young commission in itself was subject to 
operate within a set of rules that had to produce the desired results that suited state agenda. 
Despite the fact that Dalindyebo and the Thembu people protested against the commission, 
the state was not to be derailed by claims of tribal seniority of King Sabata Dalindyebo in 
Thembuland. As long as he opposed the position of the state, he and his followers were 
ignored and customary practices undermined. 
 
In the wake of the post-colonial, post-apartheid South Africa, Gibbs suggests that 
“[c]hieftancy disputes [are] not unusual”; they resurfaced and confronted the government of 
the day as expressed by Sydney Mufamadi in October 2004:  
 
Numerous traditional leadership disputes, claims and counterclaims were and still are, by all 
accounts, the order of the day. Various attempts were made to settle the disputes through 
courts of law and commissions of enquiry, to no avail. With the advent of democracy, a 
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strong voice emerged, particularly from those who were unfairly deposed in the past, 
demanding that the democratic government restore them to their rightful positions.245 
 
Mufamadi makes a point to say that the disputes emanated from within the ranks of 
traditional leaders who were unfairly treated and unfairly deposed by the past 
administrations. These traditional leaders must have used the provisions that were available 
in the Constitution and in the Traditional Leadership Framework Act 41 of 2003 to advance 
their positions.  
 
On the occasion of announcing the commission of Traditional Leadership Disputes and 
Claims on 16 October 2004 Mufamadi said: 
 
The President of the Republic of South Africa, Mr. Thabo Mbeki has appointed a 
Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims in terms of Section 23 of the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act No. 41 of 2003. Over the years, the 
colonial and successive apartheid governments passed various laws aimed at controlling the 
institution of traditional leadership. These laws inevitably impaired the image and integrity of 
the institution. When the notorious Bantustan system was introduced, the institution was 
traumatized further, through a myriad of Bantustan legislation. In the process, those legitimate 
traditional leaders who differed with the government of the day and supported the liberation 
movement, were either banished, deposed or driven into exile. Numerous traditional 
leadership disputes, claims and counterclaims were and still are, by all accounts, the order of 
the day. Various attempts were made to settle the disputes through courts of law and 
commissions of enquiry, to no avail. With the advent of democracy, a strong voice emerged, 
particularly from those who were unfairly deposed in the past, demanding that the democratic 
                                                          
245 http://www.polity.org.za/article/mufamadi-announcement-of-commission-on-traditional-leadership-disputes-
and-claims-16102004-2004-10-16 (Accessed on 21 August 2015). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 104 
 
government restore them to their rightful positions. Provincial governments appointed various 
commissions of enquiry, in an honest attempt to resolve the disputes..246 
 
Mufamadi stresses the point that the Mbeki state wants to correct the wrongs that were done 
by previous administrations. From the statement that Mufamadi issues it is spelt out in no 
uncertain terms that “[o]ver the years, the colonial and successive apartheid governments 
passed various laws aimed at controlling the institution of traditional leadership. These laws 
inevitably impaired the image and integrity of the institution”.247Putting a mark at the issue 
that he represents a democratically elected government that is subject to the Constitution as a 
supreme law of the land he sets out to articulate a departure from colonial and apartheid 
policies. Of interest to me is the question of passing the Traditional Leaders Framework Act 
of 2003, I want to ask if this piece of legislation was not part of “various laws aimed at 
controlling the institution of traditional leadership” used by the post-colonial, post-apartheid 
and democratic government to achieve the same objectives of the colonial, semi colonial and 
apartheid states?248 However, Mehta’s discourse of unfamiliarity, can be used to examine the 
workings of the post-apartheid state in producing new categories in the institution of 
traditional leadership. For instance, the institution is viewed as undemocratic and non-
representative structure with the invocation of categories, the same was at play in the Nhlapo 
commission, as the commission sought to trace blood ties of ethnic groupings in South Africa 
that are eligible for monarchical status. 
 
How independent are state mandated commissions? What are the implications of their 
mandate and operation? 
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Jeff Peires argues that “[t]he process of selection [commissioners for the composition of the 
Nhlapo commission], let alone the criteria for selection, remains obscure.”249 There is 
growing literature that questions the independence of state appointed independent 
commissions of inquiry, the literature also examines the idea of shifting responsibility on the 
part of the state when dealing with complex and sensitive matters. On the question of state 
commissions for instance, Adam Ashforth, and Belinda Bozzoli in ‘the discourses of myth 
and the myth of discourse’ argued that:  
The commission legitimate[d] the idea that the state ha[d] the ‘knowledge’ to speak on behalf 
of the natives, and to silence African political voices themselves – not only through 
repression, but through constituting an ‘official way of knowing and speaking ‘of the 
native’… which obviated from the point of view of the ruling orders, the necessity of political 
representation.250 
 
Bozzoli suggested that the state deployed commissions of enquiry in order for them to be 
means of legitimizing, endorsing and fixing the ability of the state in knowing the “native 
question”. Bozzoli suggested that this legitimation of the ways of knowing, on the part of the 
state, related to the formulation of the idea of the native question with its underlying 
meanings and implications related to speak on the “native question”.251 She argued that 
through the commission the state disguised its voice through the deployment of the notion of 
the independence of the commission. In that way the state was imagined to be behind the veil 
of the commission operating freely under its guise while it actively ordered the lives of 
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natives undetected. But more clearly the state profoundly settled in the position of 
establishing an authorized discourse on the native question. It was against that background 
that Bozzoli argued that the state developed more “authoritative ways of speaking about the 
native question”. In those ways of speaking, drawing from Ashforth, she went on to argue 
that the state devised structured ways “of speaking of, for and to the native”.252   In other 
words commissions facilitated state access to its own technologies of ordering natives, which 
was an apparatus of the state to penetrate the natives undetected through the veil of the 
commission. In other words, she suggested that Ashforth argued that the state, in establishing 
the commission, wanted to find ways of legitimating its authority when it spoke on the native 
question. This made the commission become a vehicle to the state finding itself speaking “on 
behalf of the natives” 
 
Ann Stoler, an anthropology scholar, is suspicious of state commissions found in state 
archives. She suggests that state “commissions, reports” and other documents are part and 
parcel of “archival sources” that relate to state’s aims of knowledge production and can be 
seen as monuments of states, which must be subject to close examination.253  Here Stoler is 
thinking with Premesh Lalu who argues that history contributed a lot in suppressing the 
“subaltern” and putting him or her in their “place by recourse to the modes of evidence that 
constitute the colonial archive”.254 Here they are pointing to their mistrust of the contents 
through language and process of the archive as well as its records. Stoler disagrees with 
Andrew Ashforth in his study of the Native Affairs Commission in South Africa where he 
argues that “the real seat of power’ in the modern state is ‘the bureau, the locus of writing”. 
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She instead argues that “every document comes layered” and influenced by ideologies of the 
“colonial politics”. 255 
 
In her study of state commissions in “colonial Java and early twentieth century South Africa 
Stoler argues that commissions have an ambiguous status.  
 
Commissions and statistics were features of statecraft in similar ways. Both are eighteenth-
century inventions consolidated by the nineteenth-century liberal state. Both were products 
and instantiations of the state's investment in public accountability. But commissions 
commanded more moral authority as they purported to scrutinize state practice, reveal 
bureaucratic mistakes, and produce new truths about the workings of the state itself.256 
 
Stoler argues that “commissions and statistics” are tools in the hands of the state. They 
achieve the ends of the state because they are engineered and brought to existence through 
the means of the state.257 She dates back the existence of the two crafts in the hand of the 
state to three centuries ago. This suggests that the post-apartheid state under Mbeki does not 
invent a new way of doing things by establishing the Nhlapo commission of enquiry, instead 
it reinvents the wheel. However, Stoler states that commissions commanded “more moral 
authority” when they are critical of the state by scrutinizing state practice and uncover 
bureaucratic shortcomings. She advances the notion that such a close interrogation process 
produces “new truths about the workings of the state itself.”258 In other words, it was by 
exposing the mistakes and questioning the moral authority of the state machinery that killed 
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existing notions of a well-functioning state which produces “new truths about the workings of 
the state itself”.  
 
Thabo Mbeki while addressing the National House of Traditional Leaders suggested that as a 
state president he was not meant to be interfering with the issues of commissions. This is an 
attempt to create an impression that the Nhlapo commission is free from state interference 
However, by his own admission he interfered “I must repeat that I consider it very important 
and necessary that the President should respect the views and determinations of the 
Commission.259 
 
Stoler cites two independent commissions of inquiry in Asia and South Africa; one by the 
Dutch, another by colonial state in South Africa to illustrate her argument that commissions 
of inquiries, while appearing to be indeed untangled from the state and therefore independent 
of it, are in fact intrinsically tied to the state apparatus. 
 
Finally, these commissions were quintessential "quasi-state" technologies, both part of the 
state and not, at once a product of state agents but constituted invariably by members outside 
it. If modern states gain force in part by creating and maintaining an elusive boundary 
between themselves and civil society, as Tim Mitchell has argued, such commissions 
exemplified that process. Their specific subjects were state generated, but often researched 
and written by those not in its permanent employ.260 
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In fact, their very terms of reference and configuration determine the desired results in favor 
of the state. Her argument suggests that the configuration and the terms of reference are 
carefully constructed by the state to reach the desires of the state while creating a pseudo 
distance from it. Which imply that when enough guidelines are put in place the outcomes of 
the investigation are inevitably going to satisfy the wishes of the state?261 The Nhlapo 
commission follows the same trend as stated by Stoler where most of the commissioners are 
semidetached from the state. For instance, Peires argues that the selection of commissioners 
is done by the state but it is people that are not civil servants necessarily. Stoler is spot on in 
saying “these commissions were quintessential "quasi-state" technologies, both part of the 
state and not”.262  
 
Central to the politics of commissions of enquiry is the issue of knowledge production. 
 
[Commissioners] told moral stories, they created precedent in the pursuit of evidence, and not 
least they create carefully tended histories. Nowhere is this history-making work more evident 
than in the form of the commission of inquiry or state commission. By definition, 
commissions organized knowledge, rearranged its categories, and prescribed what state 
officials were charged to know.263 
 
Stoler suggests that commissions create new truths while disguised as platforms of collecting 
evidence. In the process of interrogating evidence, a process of meaning making unfolds to 
inform how the state can intervene and get a foot hold. Commissions are means by which the 
state hide behind independence while usurping the investigated institution of its authority and 
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“organize knowledge, rearrange its categories, and prescribed what state officials were 
charged to know”.264 In this way and along these lines the Nhlapo commission reconfigured 
the space of traditional leadership in South Africa when it declined claims of kingship by 
some royal families not least of those is the Matiwane of amaMpondomise. The Nhlapo 
commission follows other commissions from the apartheid era whose aims were to interfere 
with royal family trees and seniority.  
 
 Timothy Gibbs suggests that the Young commission of inquiry into the abaThembu 
chieftaincy favored Kaizer Matanzima who was sympathetic to the state.265 He argues that the 
state interfered with the rules.266 Zulaiga Adams, in her PhD dissertation that deals with the 
stabbing of Hendrik F. Verwoerd by Demitrios Tsafendas also observes state interference in 
the so called independent commission of inquiry.  Adams suggests that the state needed to 
distance itself and its policies, specifically the weak human resources management 
procedures in parliament that led to the stabbing of Verwoerd inside parliament. In the same 
vein the Nhlapo commission has evidence of state interference under the Mbeki era, a matter 
Mbeki himself admits to in his 2007 address in the national house of traditional leaders. 
Instead of dealing with why Tsafendas stabbed Verwoerd, which emanated from the 
apartheid policies of racial discrimination and who is responsible for his access to parliament, 
the commission targeted the emigration officer that gave him access to the country. Adams 
argues that the state successfully deflected responsibility by carefully crafting the workings of 
the commission.267 Similarly, the Nhlapo commission dismisses Matiwane’s claim to 
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kingship over amaMpondomise through carefully considered means of legitimating using 
customary law. 
 
With the Nhlapo commission a question might arise as to what the state wanted to deal with, 
and how it used similar rules to arrive at its aims? Here I discuss the statements by Mufamadi 
and Mbeki on what the commission must deal with. In 2004 Government acted and attempted 
to address the matter through the establishment of the commission for disputes and claims of 
traditional leaders. Barbara Oomen observes that South Africa has patchwork democracy, she 
argues that Sydney Mufamadi articulated the central issue about the disputes and claims, “[a] 
thorny issue … [is] the legitimacy of those traditional leaders on the government payroll.” As 
Provincial and Local Government Minister Sydney Mufamadi said: ‘The integrity of 
traditional leadership cannot be adequately restored without dealing with those cases of 
traditional leaders who were allegedly imposed on people, or those who were illegitimately 
deposed for their opposition of the old order,’ and the ensuing of succession disputes”.268 
 
Sydney Mufamadi’s statement resonates with what Timothy Gibbs argues about, when he 
describes the disputes that brought instability within the traditional leadership circles in the 
1950s as a result of the introduction of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. 
 
In the 1950s the Thembu kingdom was in the midst of a dispute – the chieftaincy split over 
the figure of King Sabata Dalindyebo (b. 1928), the young paramount chief installed in 1954. 
Chieftaincy disputes were not unusual, but in the 1950s these clashes carried much broader 
significance. This was the decade in which apartheid government legislation laid the 
foundations for the creation of Bantustan self-governing territories, which followed in the 
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1960s. The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 was unpopular because it established a system of 
Tribal Authorities: new tiers of segregated, local ‘tribal’ administration in which government-
appointed chiefs took new powers. Most importantly, these new Tribal Authorities were used 
to force through rural Betterment schemes.269 
 
Gibbs highlighted the tension of the 1950s as it related to the royal house of abaThembu 
personified by Kaizer Matanzima and Sabata Dalindyebo. Of interest are the embedded 
similarities of how the state decided to intervene in a traditional leadership dispute. In the 
new South Africa traditional leaders used a different plane, political transition negotiations 
and the traditional leadership framework consultation sessions, and accused each other in 
relation to their positions and authority. In turn the president investigated the disputed claims 
and counter claims that were raised by royals. The investigating commission was set up to 
investigate and make recommendations that will aid the president to decide on the matters. At 
the time of establishing the commission President Mbeki emphasized on the restoration of the 
dignity and integrity of the Traditional Leaders institution.  
 
The establishment of the Nhlapo commission for traditional leaders’ disputes and claims 
opens an avenue for historical research into the institution. Traditional leaders that have 
claims would have to bring tangible evidence of their rightful positions before the 
promulgation of the Native Authorities Act of 1927. They have to show that the 
implementation of the Act adversely affected their position and therefore unfairly robbed 
them of their chieftain status. To satisfy the commission and the state one would have to 
present convincing evidence before the commission based on some historical evidence. To do 
so, traditional leaders have to visit their archives and the state archives. But Premesh Lalu in 
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his book The deaths of Hintsa: Postapartheid South Africa and the shape of recurring pasts, 
is suspicious of the archive. He argues that there must be a move that helps to question 
archival modes of evidence in post-apartheid South Africa: 
 
This move has to consist of an initial deconstruction of historiography and the conceptual 
ground clearing. Central to this deconstructive move, in my way view, is a problematisation 
of the notion of the colonial archive and its modes of evidence. Historians who have been 
working with official documents and colonial archive have mostly been aware of the fact that 
the colonial archive is far from being a neutral storage place, but consists rather of rules of 
formation which establish hierarchies, labels and categories. However, most historians fail to 
recognize that they are deeply implicated in this discursive formation. The colonial archive 
constitutes a pervasive system of knowledge combining poetics and the exercise of power, 
which act upon individuals and regulates their statements. It is from this shadow that I argue 
we ought to seek a line of flight. Perhaps such a move may enable a repetition of the story of 
the killing of Hintsa which is different from that which it repeats.270 
 
Lalu’s argument suggests a different reading of the archival record where most of the colonial 
and apartheid narrative of the relations between the state and the institution of traditional 
leadership. But the demands of the Nhlapo commission that calls claimants of kingship to 
justify their claims force claimants to heavily rely on the archival record without much 
interrogation. His work helped rethink the recorded and well known account of the event of 
the death of king Hintsa offering a reading of the archival record with suspicion, something 
that the Nhlapo commission did not consider much in the Matiwane claim to kingship as 
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decedents of Mhlontlo. Lalu’s work questions the authorized discourse of the death of Hintsa 
and forms part of the post-apartheid historiography that informs future archival examination. 
 
What were the key issues for the state in establishing the commission? 
 
Twala, Kompi and Seshelo argue that the establishment of the commission on disputes and 
claims of traditional leaders was an attempt by the state to make good to its promise in the 
Kempton Park political transition negotiations of the early 1990s. They draw from email 
exchanges that Kompi had with Professor Thandabantu Nhlapo while at the University of 
Cape Town in 2011.271  Again drawing from Chief Phatekile Holomisa’s book published in 
2010 they go on to argue that “It should be noted that when the Commission was established 
in 2004, South Africa had twelve paramount chiefs. The Commission had to investigate 
whether or not all the twelve paramount chiefs qualified to be recognized as kings or 
queens.”272 
 
At the time of the appointment of the Commission on Traditional Leaders Disputes and 
Claims; Sydney Mufamadi, Minister of Provincial and Local Government affairs, issues a 
press statement announcing the appointment of the Nhlapo commission in which he 
highlighted the political will to address the disputes and claims of traditional leaders. He sets 
out the legal framework on which the commission was established; namely, the Traditional 
Leaders Framework Act of 2003. 
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In the statement Mufamadi suggests that the state was responding to the impaired image and 
the integrity of the institution of Traditional Leaders which is a result of state intervention in 
the past. Mufamadi holds that “[o]ver the years, the colonial and successive apartheid 
governments passed various laws aimed at controlling the institution of traditional 
leadership.273 These laws inevitably impaired the image and integrity of the institution.”  For 
the Mufamadi the intervention of the state hampered the independence and credibility of the 
institution. He also suggests that the institution “was traumatized” to a greater degree by the 
draconian laws of the apartheid state when it introduced the “Bantustan” system. This 
reference by Mufamadi relates to what scholars identified as strategies of “direct and indirect 
rule” and “centralized and decentralized despotism” that were used by the colonial and 
apartheid states respectively.274To this end the democratic state is stepping in to right the 
wrong. 
 
In entering the space of conflicting interests and attempting to resolve them the state goes 
about influencing key institutions that can assist it in this regard. Thabo Mbeki in his capacity 
as the head of state refers to “long standing disputes” in his speech of 22 February 2005; this 
is only four months after he appointed the commission of inquiry into the disputes and claims 
of traditional leaders. Mbeki addresses himself to the issue of resolving all disputes that relate 
to traditional leaders on the occasion of him opening the National House of Traditional 
leaders in Parliament:  
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The Department of Provincial and Local Government is actively involved in the 
implementation of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, which our 
Parliament passed in November 2003.In this regard, you will have noted that an independent 
Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims was established in November 
2004. This Commission has the task to investigate and resolve long-standing traditional 
leadership disputes. Clearly, this House has the responsibility to assist in ensuring that our 
traditional leaders and communities refer all disputes and claims to the Commission. This will 
help expedite the finalization of the work of the Commission within the prescribed five-year 
period. I was informed that the first formal meeting between the Commission and the 
National House took place yesterday. I am quite confident that you had a fruitful interaction 
with the Commission, and that you will continue to engage with one another on a regular 
basis.275 
 
Mbeki suggests that the commission has the mandate to “investigate and resolve” “all 
disputes and claims”.276 Here the commission is given all the powers to “investigate and 
resolve” the issues. In the commission report there is a consistent line which is evidence of 
conferred state craft “The Commission has the authority to investigate all traditional 
leadership claims and disputes dating from 1 September 1927, subject to subsection 
(2)(a)(vi)”.277 
 
In 2008 after confirming receipt of the report of the Nhlapo commission he associates the 
work of the commission with what he calls institutional support for “Kings and Queens”: 
 
                                                          
275 http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=3129 (accessed on 5 September 2015) 
276 http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=3129. (accessed on 5 September 2015) 
277 Final Report on amaMpondomise claim 
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The implementation of the Framework Act on Traditional Leadership has revealed that the 
Act requires further refinement, especially as regards the issues of the efficient functioning of 
the Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims Commission. Equally, more refinement is 
required with regard to institutional support to our Kings and Queens and other challenges 
regarding provincial peculiarities. The necessary Bill is currently being drafted and will be 
subjected to a process of public consultation before its enactment.278 
 
The commission concerned itself with determining the status of Kings who have a following 
of about 30 percent of the population of South Africa. Most of these are located in rural areas 
where the traditional leadership is respected the most.  
 
In 2008 the office of the state president instituted another study by Pearl Sithole and 
Thamsanqa Mbele into the affairs of traditional leaders which sought to establish if the 
institution of traditional leadership was successfully integrated into the democratic system of 
South Africa.279 Sithole and Mbele argue that the president instituted a different study to 
monitor the alignment of the institution of traditional leaders to the democratic system. This 
is in line with the early discussion about the role of the institution in the new South Africa 
while the ANC was still in exile. There was a strong feeling that this institution needs to be 
democratized if it is to exist in a democratic South Africa.280 On the other hand the study 
suggests that the post-apartheid state in like manner as its prediseccors aims at controlling 
and aligning the institution of traditional leaders. 
 
                                                          
278 http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=4204 (accessed on 5 September 2015) 
279 Pearl Sithole and Thamsanqa Mbele, ‘Fifteen Year Review on Traditional Leadership 
A Research Paper’, (Durban: Human Sciences Research Council Democracy and Governance, 2008), p 1 
280 Albie Sachs tapes (Cape Town: University of the Western Cape and Robben Island Museum, 2009). 
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Who were the key role players in the commission and the politics of power and 
knowledge in the commission? 
 
Jeff Peires who is one of the commissioners suggests that the commission was evenly spread 
out: 
 
On 22 October 2004, the President appointed twelve Commissioners on the basis of being 
“knowledgeable regarding customs and the institution of traditional leadership.”  The process 
of selection, let alone the criteria for selection, remains obscure.  The Chairperson, Prof 
Thandabantu Nhlapo, had been Chair of the Project Committee on customary Law at the 
South African Law Commission.   Of the eleven other members of the Commission, six were 
specialized in Law, three in Language and Culture, one in Education and one (myself) in 
History. The distribution of Commissioners according to Gender and Province was admirably 
balanced but it is clear that the Social Sciences were badly under-represented.  Besides 
myself, the only person attached to the Commission who had any background in Politics, 
Sociology or Anthropology, was Ms. Welile Khuzwayo, an anthropologist seconded from the 
National Department of Traditional Affairs, and she, being a seconded official, was excluded 
from the deliberations of the Commission. 281 
 
The representation of different experts in the commission relates to the capacity of the 
commission in dealing with a variety of matters and suggests that they emanate from the 
relationship between the state and the institution of traditional leaders. This spread of experts 
also suggests a commitment of the state to capacitate the commission to deal with the wide 
range of issues that are likely to arise in the intervening period. However, Peires argues that 
                                                          
281 Jeff Peires, ‘History versus Customary Law: The Commission on Traditional Leadership: Disputes and 
Claims (2004 – 2012) unpublished paper, (Alice: University of Fort Hare, 2013), p1. 
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the commission does not adequately represent the “Social Sciences” which suggests that it 
has an over representation of other experts than those of the Social Sciences who must be 
seen as relevant for the commission. In this way he is taking pains that he is the only historian 
in the team of commissioners. The over representation of legal experts suggests that the state 
wants more strength on the legal side, probably so as to prevent legal recourse on the part of 
traditional leaders. The Natives Administration Act of 1927 is another strong signal to the 
same effect of using the law as promulgated by the state as opposed to historical validity. 
 
Twala, Kompi and Selesho agree with Peires about the shape and size of the commission. 
They argue that “According to Nhlapo, the commissioners reflected diversity in terms of 
ethnicity, profession and relevant academic disciplines. Most of the commissioners were 
lawyers, from language and culture units and from social sciences.”282 
 
 
 
 
How the Mhlontlo Chieftaincy came to be presented to the Nhlapo Commission 
 
In 2007 Loyiso Matiwane a great grandson of Mhlontlo, the last recognized king of 
amaMpondomise under colonial rule, represented the royal council of argued that the Nhlapo 
Commission should restore the kingship of amaMpondomise under his (Matiwane’s) 
leadership. In a verbal submission to the Nhlapo Commission Mr. Linda Mbabama the 
spokesperson of the Matiwane pleaded with the Commission to consider their predicament in 
                                                          
282 Chitja Twala and Jacob Selasho, ‘The Socio-political Consequence of the Commission on Traditional 
Leadership Disputes and Claims in South Africa: A Post-Apartheid or Modern Political Discourse within the 
ANC Led Government?’, Journal of Social Sciences Interdisciplinary Reflection of Contemporary Society, 
40(2), (New Delhi: Kamla-Raj Enterprises, 2014), p 172  
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the spirit of the founding principles of the Commission. “We humbly request this 
Commission to restore the Mpondomise Kingship status which, were it not for the death of 
Hamilton Hope [which led to the exile of about twenty years in Lesotho and a later deposition 
which was a direct result of Mhlontlo’s prosecution emanating from the killing of Hamilton 
Hope in Sulenkama], would be existing even today and there would have been no need for us 
to sit before this Commission.”283 Mbabama argued for the restoration of the dignity and 
integrity of the amaMpondomise Royal Council. 
 
According to the report of the Nhlapo Commission  
 
There are three claimants to the position of kingship of amaMpondomise namely: (a)Loyiso 
Matiwane, claims on behalf of the house of Matiwane. Loyiso Matiwane claims he is the 
rightful heir to the kingship of amaMpondomise in that he is a direct descendant of Cira. (b) 
Vicks Velile Thonjeni, claims on behalf of the house of Thonjeni; Vicks Velile Thonjeni 
claims he is the rightful heir to the kingship of amaMpondomise in that he is the direct 
descendant of Dosini.(c)Masibulele Maseti, claims on behalf of the house of Maseti. 
Masibulele Maseti claims that he is the rightful heir as he is a direct descent of Dam who was 
a brother to Dosini. The son and heir of Dosini died without issue therefore, Dam as the 
surviving paternal uncle, and next in line would have succeeded Dosini.284 
 
It is not clear how the Nhlapo commission dealt with this multiple clam to one position 
except for dismissing all three claims on the basis of the absence of a nation defining war for 
amaMpondomise, while ignoring that Mpondo and Mpondomise were twins. But according 
to Majija’s Dark clouds at Sulenkama: a true story, the key arguments of the submission 
                                                          
283 Joe H. Majija, Dark clouds at Sulenkama: a true story, (Umthatha: 2009) p 57. 
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revolve around the notion of legitimation. The Royal Council wanted to be recognized as a 
kingship and entered a process of contestation which brings heritage to life. amaMpondomise 
present three claims to the Commission that demanded historical insight than legal 
persuasion.  
 
Writing posthumously about Mhlontlo 
 
In this part of my study I want to ask a question about what it means to write about Mhlontlo 
posthumously, when semantically posthumously suggests after the fact of existence as the 
Canadian cultural studies scholar Zsuzsa Baross suggests?285 I want to explore the metaphor 
of death and the lessons that are activated after the fact of death. As I explore how history and 
historiography deals with the legacy of Mhlontlo I also want to lean on what Baross argues 
posthumous teachings after Jacques Derrida’s last breath was long taken: 
 
For this last lesson unlike, any other before it, remains incomplete in an extraordinary 
manner, irreducible to the vulgar (meaningless) interruption that death always is. It is not left 
unfinished, its transmission has not been interrupted by a brutal yet banal intervention from 
the outside, on the contrary, the lesson is in completed, its meaning suspended, deferred 
(opened) to the future, when precisely there is no more future left to live. As we will see, this 
happens not by accident of circumstance. The teaching that by necessity arrives last from you 
necessarily arrives not last but posthumously. If as inheritors we are in mourning … it is not 
because the one who professes to know is no longer with us and cannot teach us. The cause 
rather lies with the difficult wisdom itself: the heterodidactic between life and death is not a 
                                                          
285Zsuzsa Baross, Posthumously, for Jacques Derrida, (Sussex University Press, 2011). 
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given … to be handed down; it cannot be given since it partakes in the spectrality of ghosts, 
arrive after the fact (of death) as the pure (after)-effect of a sending from this side of the 
border of life … returning or repeating itself from the other side.286 
 
Baross here writes this passage as a direct consequence of the lessons that come to being after 
the fact of Jacques Derrida’s death with the intention to extract lessons from his exemplary 
life of an educator. She interrogates the idea of lessons that get communicated in as a result of 
the fact of death. The metaphor of death as Baross extrapolates I further stretch in relation to 
the legacy of Mhlontlo. For instance, Mhlontlo died in 1909, his memory was carefully laid 
to rest in the state archive as one blood thirsty despot in the area of Qumbu. In the state 
archive and the historiography that is generated from such record emphatically inter him as 
one traditional leader that killed an innocent humble servant of the crown who never had 
ulterior motives. Scholars like Christopher Saunders and Clifton Crais attempted to bring the 
memory of Mhlontlo back to life albeit arguing along fixed tropes of their disciplines.287 
However, the democratic state of South Africa through its processes of the Nhlapo 
commission resurrected into national memory the figure of Mhlontlo as king of 
amaMpondomise. It is at this point that my interest in dealing with issues of coexistence, of 
subordination, domination and resistance of post-colonial, post-apartheid and democratic 
state alongside a pre-colonial “backward” “residual” institution of traditional authority come 
to bear on the argument.288 
                                                          
286 Zsuzsa Baross, Posthumously, for Jacques Derrida, (Sussex University Press, 2011), p 8. 
287 Christopher C. Saunders, ‘The Transkeian Rebellion of 1880–81: A Case-Study of Transkeian Resistance to 
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When Mhlontlo died he was a pauper even though he was once the presiding king of 
amaMpondomise until 1880 when Hamilton Hope died, after his role in leading the people 
under him for many years. Even the narrative of his life as was reflected in the colonial 
archival record was questioned. My interest was in understanding the ways in which 
Mhlontlo was presented and represented in the archival assemblage. I wanted to also 
understand the archival practices that put his story to rest and how the records that penned his 
life were carefully treated in order to present his past in an ordered fashion.  
 
After the state commission of enquiry called the Nhlapo commission, a name it was 
associated with as a result of its chairperson Professor Thandabantu Nhlapo, it became 
important for claiming families to enter the evidentiary space. It was at this point of 
convergence between the empire language and the existing record that the archive, its modes 
of evidence and grammar became important to families with royal claims. Looking for 
evidence became pivotal as a means to validate, endorse, refute and denounce claims and 
counter claims by each family with a royal claim. In approaching the Nhlapo Commission 
researchers in the future will look for some ‘unconscious historical discourse’ that entailed 
everything that had to be repressed in order to make possible the kind of historical discourse 
they met with in our culture today. The history that was able to link with literature was better 
able to connect and appreciate.  
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Conclusion 
 
In the first chapter the discourse was about going along the archival grain and against the 
archival grain attempting to recover the voice of Mhlontlo utilizing existing and most used 
archival record as well as that which was omitted in the official narrative. Drawing from 
Zsuzsa Baross’ Posthumously, for Jacques Derrida I ask what did it mean to write 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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posthumously for Mhlontlo when, unlike Derrida who had the whole archive to propound his 
voice in posterity, Mhlontlo had the official record representation and a scantly recorded oral 
history. The posthumously that took into account that Mhlontlo according to scholars of the 
archive was carefully laid to rest through colonial “representation” (a term I use borrowing 
from Stuart Hall).289 A view that Jacques Derrida himself alluded to in ‘Admiration For 
Nelson Mandela’ as white power. Just like in Ronald Barthes’ ‘Dominici’ where the 
conventional system of writing disadvantaged the uneducated old man facing his trial not 
because he did not know the language, but because the system and representation both 
overpowered the old man. Mhlontlo as he was presented and represented in the archive stood 
no grounds of defending himself over the hegemony the systems of writing produced together 
with the presentation and representation in colonial and empire literature, law and journalism 
all of which put him to rest in the state archive.290 In was rendered as one that did not have a 
voice of his own as the colonial officials, the official record and regimes of the archive 
demanded that he be put to rest as one murderous traditional leader. However, Joe Majija, 
Sibizwa Mdaka and Archibald C Jordaan interrupted and questioned the knowledge power 
relations that were established by the systems of writing and gave Mhlontlo a voice that was 
never afforded to him by the regime of the official archive and the academy.  
 
Chapter two dealt with the state instituted commission of inquiry called Nhlapo Commission 
and how it linked with the institution of traditional leadership in general and the house of 
Mhlontlo in particular afforded me a view in the politics of tradition and progress. As such 
the study was in part influenced by the impression or not taking things as they are presented. 
For instance, the state presented the formation of the commission of enquiry as independent 
                                                          
289 Scholars such as Achille Mbembe, Anne Stoler, Jacques Derridda and Premesh Lalu demonstrated the 
workings of the archives in more elaborate ways than space allowed in this study. 
290 For a better understanding of Dominici see: Roland Barthes, ‘Dominici, or the triumph of literature’, in 
Simon During(ed), The Cultural Studies Reader, (London: Routledge, 1993), pp 42-45. 
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without state influence and persuasion. However, the study investigated closely the subtle 
involvement of the state and how that involvement was informed by the unresolved issues 
from the political transition negotiations that led to the 1994 breakthrough. To some extent 
the study was influenced by Stuart Hall’s idea of “interrogating the image” in his lecture on 
representations media and cultural studies at the Open University. Where Hall referred to an 
actual image or picture that got used in mass media and impressing the tendency of 
questioning the image and the reasons for its projection and the meanings it helped to 
produce. In similar ways, taking from Hall the study used the metaphor of an image for the 
commission and questioned what the state presented as independent and objective. Hall for 
instance argued for an interrogation of the image and getting to understand the meanings that 
get produced and the constitution of meanings. This study interrogated the politics of the 
relationship between the South African state under Thabo Mbeki and the institution of 
traditional leadership using the Nhlapo Commission. As I studied this situation there were 
underlying tensions that found expression in the form of the Whig tradition of history which 
was an inheritance (I use inheritance in terms of what Jacques Derrida helped to produce in 
‘Admiration for Nelson Mandela’) of British colonialism and empire. The first chapter 
gleaned on what the new South African state inherited from its predecessors, in ‘The Laws in 
Reflection’ Derrida reflected on what he called “Admiration for Nelson Mandela”: 
 
But if he admires this tradition, does it mean that he is its inheritor, its simple inheritor? Yes, 
and no, depending on what is meant here by inheritance. You can recognize an authentic 
inheritor in the one who conserves and reproduces, but also in the one who respects the logic 
of the legacy enough to turn it upon occasion against those who claim to be its guardians, 
enough to reveal, despite and against the usurpers, what has never yet been seen in the 
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inheritance: enough to give birth, by the unheard-of act of a reflection, to what had never seen 
the light of day.291 
 
Here Derrida referred to the Magna Carta declaration of human rights that was developed in 
Britain which Mandela said he admired during the famous Revonia trial of the early 1960s. 
Mandela’s admiration balanced on the respect for human rights that the Margna Carta 
declaration produced and it was where he based his arguments when he defended himself in 
the Revonia trial. At the trial Mandela twisted on its head the idea of admiration and 
presented himself as one that truly inherited the Margna Carta declaration as opposed the 
white minority state that saw itself as genuine inheritors of progress and advocates of 
liberties. The chapter showed nuances of an inheritance that flowed from British institutions 
to those of the new South Africa where Mandela was central in setting into existence in the 
democratic dispensation. 
 
Chapter three tried to follow how the ANC in exile developed its constitutional proposals as 
it prepared itself for power and the debates that ensued around the proposed inclusion of the 
institution of traditional leadership back then in 1986 to 1988. Once in South Africa; during 
the political transition negotiations in Kempton Park, the ANC made concessions to 
traditional leaders about the inclusion of the institution of traditional leadership into the South 
African constitution. The chapter followed some of the processes, the comings and goings 
between traditional leaders and the political organizations that were interested and affected by 
their interests during that period.  
 
                                                          
291 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1535685X.2014.896149  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 128 
 
During the negotiations the ANC was a popular political organization that seemed carry the 
mandate of every sector of the South African society including the institution of traditional 
leadership. However, the contradictions between the mandate of civil society were not (I am 
borrowing from Stuart Hall) interrogated at the point of intersection with the interests of 
Communist Party that espoused the idea of “people’s power” which appeared to be hostile to 
traditional leadership.  
 
The emergence of CONTRALESA and the discussion paper that Maduna presented at the in 
house seminar of March 1988 brought about a change of heart on the political organization. 
In October 2004 Thabo Mbeki established the Nhlapo commission as to deal with bigger 
issues that were ignored during the political transition negotiations in Kempton Park where 
traditional leaders short changed their cause by entrusting the ANC with their interests. Lastly 
I am drawing from Adorno, to formulate a question in this chapter: did the ANC; both in 
exile and in South Africa after the unbanning as a major political organization and later as a 
ruling party; use the technology at its disposal to produce individuation among South 
Africans in general and the traditional leadership institution in particular?292 
 
Chapter four leaned on various scholars of state commissions of enquiry who interrogated 
that the idea of the “independent” in independent commissions of inquiry. These scholars 
showed that there was no sense of independence in state commissions of inquiry because 
their terms of reference, their constitution and workings and disciplines involved emaciated 
the “independent”. My examination of the Nhlapo commission with the help of Jeff Pieres 
especially where his scholarship intersects with that of Ann Stoler, Zulaiga Adams and Adam 
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Ashforth suggested conformity to the held trends of state commissions of enquiry. The 
chapter was invested in the politics of state commissions of enquiry where the state advanced 
the idea of the independent” to validate their claim that all state commissions of inquiry were 
independent. I drew from different studies both locally and internationally to question that 
assertion of the state.  
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